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Abstract 
Effect of CEO Human Capital 
on Managerial Decision Making and Firm Growth 
K wangJ oo Koo 
Anthony Curatola, Ph.D. (Supervisor) 
viii 
This dissertation examines how CEO human capital, one of the most critical issues in 
recent firm research, affects crucial managerial decisions and firm growth. 
Academics and practitioners have increasingly focused on human capital given the 
value that it provides to firms. Scholars have recently begun exploring the role of 
human capital in CEO selection and compensation schemes. For example, Kaplan, 
Mark, and Morton (2011) document the important characteristics and abilities of 
candidate CEOs. Building on upper echelon theory and human capital theory, the 
present study hypothesizes that managerial decisions and firm performance depend on 
CEO human capital. It also documents two types of human capital that play mutually 
exclusive roles in determining fixed and contingent components of compensation: 
general human capital and firm-specific human capital. My findings suggest that 
CEO human capital is essential to understanding firm operations, and that general 
human capital is the most important driver of firms' value-enhancing investment 
activities over a nine-year period, consistent with human capital theory. Finally, the 
study outlines possible avenues that scholars can pursue to further examine the role of 
human capital in managerial decision making and firm growth. 
Keywords: Managerial Human Capital, Firm, CEO 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This study examines how firms vary with the importance attached to CEO human 
capital' and documents whether strong CEO human capital enhances firm value through 
optimal managerial decisions. Given that the primary responsibility of a CEO is to increase 
firm value, how exactly do CEOs enhance the value of the firms that they manage? In 
addition, what forms of CEO human capital serve as screening devices that are intended to 
maximize firm outcomes (with the intent to resolve adverse selection problems)? 
Institutional investors and shareholders have recently shown increasing interest in the 
enhanced disclosure of CEO characteristics and CEO succession planning. In response, the 
SEC provided guidance by publishing Staff Legal Bulletin 14E (SLB 14E) in October 2009. 
Firms are now required to disclose strategic decisions that are based on CEO succession 
decisions and CEO characteristics because CEOs have different attributes that influence the 
human capital accumulated by firms. Recent decades have prompted awareness of the 
specificity of CEO human capital. Previous studies provide theoretical underpinnings for the 
distribution of CEO human capital in firms (Gabaix and Landier 2008). Graham, Li, and Qui 
(20 1 0) suggest that CEO human capital have explanatory power for compensation schemes. 
Thus, I extend the stream of research devoted to this issue by examining the effect of CEO 
human capital on firm outcomes. 
Previous literature on accounting, strategy, management, and finance focus on 
incentive contracts in the moral hazard context to explain the determination of CEO 
compensation that is contingent on firm performance.2 In this stream of literature, however, 
1 CEO human capital is defmed as the abilities, knowledge, skills, and experiences that incumbents bring to their 
work (see Schultz 1961; Becker 1962; Agarwal1981). 
2 Real-world pay-for-performance sensitivity, however, has not been documented as comprehensively as 
expected in the agency theory literature (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Murphy 1999; 
2 
CEO human capital is assumed an exogenous parameter. Using these models to compare 
different executive pay levels and firm outcomes across firms over time is therefore 
impossible. Given that little empirical evidence exists on the effect of CEO human capital on 
CEO compensation and firms (Dutta 2008; Frydman 2010), the model in the current study 
provides new insights by including CEO human capital as an endogenous factor. I examine 
how general human capital and firm-specific human capital are accumulated within a firm. 
Unlike previous research, the present work more comprehensively explains the overall 
aspects of CEO human capital through hand-collected observations of CEOs who work at 
S&P 500 firms over the period 2001-2009. 
Upper echelon theory holds that CEO characteristics influence firm decisions and 
policies, and therefore, the actions adopted by firms, because CEOs influence strategic 
managerial policies that ultimately affect firm outcomes (Hambrick and Mason 1984). In 
theory, CEOs with weak human capital misallocate a firm's costly assets and less efficiently 
oversee operations, thereby diminishing the long-term value of the firm. By contrast, CEOs 
with strong human capital are expected to use more sophisticated methods, through which 
they presumably enhance long-term firm value (Graham and Harvey 2002). To maximize 
overall firm value, therefore, firms must hire CEOs with the skill sets required for effective 
management. The value ofthis study is rooted in its explanation of the need for CEOs to 
understand how they affect the managerial decisions in a firm. 
Human capital theory indicates that human capital is a critical factor in explaining how 
people develop their abilities and accumulate their experiences for professional growth and 
Core and Guay 1999; Ittner et al. 2003), and pay-for-performance prevails when the level of compensation is 
examined. For example, the shareholders ' wealth in S&P 500 firms has decreased more than CEO compensation 
in these firms between 2004 and 2007. This decrease indicates that pay-for-performance does not fully explain 
the complete dynamics of the determination of CEO managerial human capital. As a result, the determinants and 
objectives of appropriate CEO managerial characteristics for firms remain ambiguous and understood only 
partially because extant literature has primarily investigated firm-level performance variables and fail to 
consider managerial human capital. 
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contributions to an entity (Schultz 1961; Becker 1962; Mincer 1974). This theory shows that 
effective CEOs have professional knowledge, experience, and expertise that are contributory 
to firms and society. Murphy and Zabojnik (2008) and Frydman (201 0) provide evidence 
that CEO human capital is tenure invariant, and suggest that firms pay a premium on 
managerial human capital. 
To gain an understanding of how CEOs perceive their roles in a firm, I use two sets of 
proxies to depict CEO human capital (Becker 1962; Harris and Helfat 1997). The first is 
general human capital, which captures the characteristics ofCEOs' managerial positions and 
professional profiles in the firms that they previously worked for. It includes the 
characteristics of the CEOs' previous positions, education, experience in the positions, and 
press coverage while employed in the companies. The second proxy is firm-specific human 
capital, which includes the characteristics that capture the measurable outcomes ofCEOs' 
actions at their current employers. It also includes firm-level measures of performance and 
the quality of financial performance over managerial tenure. These measures represent the 
objective outcomes of CEO human capital; I assume that CEOs with strong human capital 
deliver higher performance and produce better value-enhancing strategic decisions than do 
CEOs with weak human capital. 
One may argue that the differences in general human capital and firm-specific human 
capital affect various strategic decisions. Thus, I investigate the effect of CEOs with both 
perspectives. General human capital is applicable across organizations, indicating that it is 
broadly valuable in the executive labor market or in all complex corporations; it is not 
specific to a certain organization (Becker 1993). The value of firm-specific human capital, 
on the other hand, is limited to within a particular area or a particular organization (Becker 
1993). These human capital estimates enable the approximation of individual CEO human 
capital from a CEO's realized performance on a fiscal year basis. According to human 
capital theory, compensation schemes are related to the human capital that incumbents bring 
to their office (Agarwal1981). Similarly, the human capital-based view highlights the 
relationship between CEO human capital and compensation schemes (Castanias and Helfat 
1991). 
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Two related social science theories-human capital theory and upper echelon theory-
which have been applied to CEO human capital research suggest that such human capital 
creates firm value when applied to the efficient operation of a firm (Hambrick and Mason 
1984; Harris and Helfat 1997; Murphy and Zabojnik 2008; Frydman 201 0). These two 
theories have been useful in explaining why CEO human capital becomes more difficult to 
create or replace over time, and why it is considered valuable from a capability perspective 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). The present study uses these theories as the framework in 
examining whether human capital enables better prediction of when such backgrounds can be 
translated into competitive human capital (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Teece et al. 1997). 
Taking an economics approach to this research, as well as using human capital theory and 
upper echelon theory, I predict that CEO human capital influences both operations-related 
management decisions and compensation schemes. 
The results are consistent with my predictions. That is, general (firm-specific) human 
capital has a statistically significant effect on CEO fixed compensation (or contingent pay), 
after firm-level performance variables have been controlled for. The results are consistent 
with human capital theory, suggesting that CEO human capital explains increments to CEO 
compensation schemes. I also find that return on assets (ROA), 3 or stock returns with respect 
to current and previous periods' total assets, changes as human capital measures are included 
3 ROA is defmed as EBIITDA/lagged assets. 
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as exogenous parameters in the traditional pay-for-performance relationship. Specifically, 
when human capital variables are included, the correlation between CEO fixed compensation 
and past ROA performance increases, whereas that between fixed compensation and current 
ROA performance decreases. Even for contingent compensation, the effect of current ROA 
diminishes after CEO human capital variables are included as exogenous parameters. In 
addition, the results indicate that externally hired CEOs negotiate compensation packages and 
attempt to secure fixed incomes when they are hired. In nearly every instance, the estimated 
coefficients reflect the predicted values and the results are generally both statistically and 
economically significant. 
Consistent with Frydman (201 0), among human capital measures, general human 
capital is strongly associated with research and development (R&D) expenses and firm 
growth. I also find that general human capital is negatively associated with the cost 
asymmetry that stems from selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses. In the 
presence of human capital, the relationship between CEO compensation and different types 
ofhuman capital is consistent with optimal contracting and the view that the decisions on 
value-enhancing activities are affected by the human capital possessed by CEO candidates. 
In line with my expectations, I show that CEO human capital is positively related to firm 
performance. Overall, I find that the importance ofhuman capital to a firm supports the 
validity of human capital theory and upper echelon theory. The results also show that human 
capital variables are strongly associated with CEO power, suggesting new research avenues 
in the area of corporate governance. 
Using the hand-collected data, I examine whether the proxies for human capital are 
correlated with the other measures of managerial ability used in the literature (Gabaix and 
Landier 2008) and with market reactions to appointment announcements (Hayes and Schaefer 
1999; Chang, Wu, and Wong 2010) and board characteristics (Khurana 2002). I also 
investigate how human capital measures influence value-enhancing activities, firm growth, 
and pay premiums in a firm. The hand-collected personal data on CEOs are obtained from 
Marquis Who's Who. 
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This study intends to fill the gap in extant management accounting literature by looking 
into the relationships among human capital, compensation schemes, and firms' strategic 
decisions. It makes two major contributions. First, it identifies and explores whether CEO 
compensation schemes are efficiently determined by CEO human capital. The results show 
that different types of CEO human capital are associated with (i) compensation schemes 
(fixed vs. contingent pay), (ii) managerial decisions, and (iii) firm growth. This study 
therefore complements those of Milbourn (2003), Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006), and 
Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang (2008), who examine the relationship between a few 
proxies for managerially perceived CEO human capital and total compensation. As for 
compensation schemes, the current work breaks down CEO compensation schemes into fixed 
and contingent pays because multi-dimensional human capital differentially affects CEO 
compensation schemes, and thus, the sensitivity to unequal pay-for-human capital. I also 
extend the works ofFrydman (2010) and Aivazian, Lai, and Rahaman (2011), who 
investigate the comparative influence of managerial human capital on CEO compensation 
schemes. I treat CEOs as independent of firms in an attempt to draw inferences about the 
potential causal link between CEO human capital and compensation schemes. 
The second distinguishing characteristic of this study is that it provides advocate 
evidence for upper echelon theory literature, in which various forms of human capital 
variables are used to ascertain whether top managers are key to determining important firm 
outcomes. Although previous studies acknowledge the effect of CEO human capital on firms 
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(Aivazian et al. 2011; Kaplan et al. 2011), to the best of my knowledge, they have not 
comprehensively considered the role of CEO human capital in firm decisions related to 
value-enhancing activities. By investigating how CEO human capital influences value-
enhancing activities (such as R&D spending and SG&A costs), this study expands our 
understanding of the effect of human capital specificity, an area of limited research. This 
study is a first attempt to investigate and document how different types of CEO human 
capital influence a firm's strategic cost decisions on maximizing firm value. From a 
practitioner's standpoint, this study provides evidence on the potential influence of different 
types of human capital on the strategic policies of a firm by linking the multiple specificity of 
CEO human capital and by extending the literature on the role of CEO characteristics 
(Graham et al. 201 0). This study also complements the evidence provided by Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2008) and Frydman (2010), who indicate that the nature of CEO human capital has 
changed over decades and that general human capital has recently become more important 
than firm-specific human capital. 
Overall, I document that CEO human capital is an important source of variation in 
firms' strategic decisions on value-enhancing activities. This dissertation complements and 
extends the stream of research by focusing not on any single aspect of CEO human capital 
(e.g., reputation, education, experience), but on the overall effect of CEO skill sets. Taken 
together, the results presented here demonstrate that CEO human capital is a powerful driver 
of firms growing concern over accounting, finance, economics, management, and 
organizational theories. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
developed hypotheses and provides the design of the empirical tests. Chapter 3 discusses the 
sample and the details of the empirical measures of CEO human capital. Chapter 4 provides 
the empirical results and Chapter 5 presents the summary and recommended research 
directions. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
This dissertation extends previous research on management accounting and 
management by approaching human capital from a human capital perspective. On the basis 
of the arguments presented in Chapter 1, I measure human capital using the various CEO 
characteristics related to the skills and knowledge that they have acquired through schooling, 
work experience, and training. This chapter presents the main hypotheses that are based on 
relevant literature on accounting, management, finance, and economics. 
2.2 Human Capital Theory 
2.2.1 Human Capital 
The term "human capital" was first used by Schultz ( 1961 ). In the same year, 
9 
Weisbrod ( 1961) develops the first conceptual framework for estimating the value of human 
capital. Later, Becker (1964) establishes a model of individual investment in human capital. 
From this perspective, human capital is regarded as similar to the physical means of 
production, indicating that human capital is interpreted as pertaining to all accumulated 
activities that influence future real income through the embedding of resources (Becker 1962). 
Therefore, CEOs make up an important part of the labor force even though they represent a 
small proportion of the personnel in their firms. CEO human capital is important because 
individuals tend to differ in their preferences, risk-aversion behaviors, skills, and opinions. 
Thus, firms' strategic policies are likely to depend on and vary with the specificity of CEO 
human capital. 
Human capital theory maintains that knowledge increases individuals' cognitive 
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abilities, leading to engagement in more productive and efficient activities (Becker 1964). 
According to this theory, compensation is related to the different skills and experiences of top 
executives (Agarwal1981). Aivazian et al. (2011) use the interactions between general 
managerial skills and firm-specific skills to study various trends in the US executive labor 
market. They show that CEO human capital affects firm performance, and that better 
performance also explains the excess in CEO compensation relative to a typical firm in the 
industry. Fama (1980) suggests that managers "rent out" their human capital to a firm, and 
the measure of their human capital reflected by the managerial labor market is likely to 
depend on the success or failure of the firm. Thus, I expect a positive correlation among 
CEO human capital, compensation schemes, and value-enhancing investments. However, 
previous literature suggests that managerial human capital has components that fit in different 
human capital classifications. I discuss the two dimensions ofhuman capital in the next 
section (Becker 1962; Harris and Helfat 1997). 
2.2.2 General Human Capital 
All CEOs have general human capital (e.g., innate abilities) that is transferrable to any 
organization and across firms or industries. General human capital is valuable because it 
integrates new knowledge and new experience, which can enhance a firm's survival in and 
adaptation to a new environment (Dimov and Shephard 2005; Frydman 2010). I consider 
four aspects of general human capital that have been documented in previous literature 
(Becker 1964; Harris and Helfat 1997; Murphy and Zabojnik 2004, 2007; Frydman 2009): 
experience, education, age, and reputation. 
Experience plays a critical role in intellectual performance. It facilitates the integration 
and accumulation of new knowledge, as well as adaptation to new situations. Therefore, 
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previous experience in different organizations enables a CEO to accumulate new knowledge; 
such experience is therefore a component of human capital. Experience can be accumulated 
through practical learning that takes place in various job positions that the CEO has held, 
such as that occurring in the finance, accounting, marketing, R&D, and law fields. Thus, 
broad labor market experience and specific vocationally oriented experience are theoretically 
predicted to increase general human capital (Becker 1964). Neal (1995) also finds that a 
worker's previous career path (law, finance, accounting, technological, and other 
management-related careers) is a proxy for his/her human capital. Black and Lynch (1996) 
find that if workers' specializations change as they take on new jobs, their human capital is 
not as valuable as that of other workers. If CEOs shift industries, then their human capital is 
no longer specific but general-a transition that visibly affects firm growth. I argue that 
CEOs who have worked in multiple firms and industries throughout their careers have more 
general human capital than those who have worked in one firm during the entirety of their 
careers. The rationale is that such CEOs have acquired a greater breadth of knowledge. Thus, 
the number of career paths, the number of years during which CEOs held a CEO position 
during their careers, and previous experience in different firms and industries are expected to 
be important components of general human capital. 
Education is an important predictor of future success (Davidsson and Honig 2003). A 
number of studies reveal that CEO performance is associated with higher levels of education, 
such as master's or bachelor's degrees (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Palia 2001). Economic 
studies based on the functions ofhuman capital earnings also suggest that a CEO's level of 
education is associated with increased compensation (Card 1999). Firms allow CEOs to 
choose their human capital composition and show that individuals invest more in acquiring 
general managerial skills (e.g., obtaining an MBA or JD degree) as the importance of general 
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human capital increases. Consequently, the number of disciplines studied by CEOs during 
their careers and the highest degrees that they earn are also expected to be important 
components of general human capital. 
Age4 is another indicator of the accumulation of general human capital. Two opposite 
interpretations of age as an indicator exist. Young CEOs are reluctant to jeopardize their 
future compensation, therefore avoiding risky activities. This tendency indicates that the 
compensation structures of CEOs change throughout their careers. By contrast, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) argue that CEOs have preferences for quiet lives, a tendency that is 
likely to increase with age. As CEOs grow older, energy levels decline. CEO human capital 
is likely to change with age. Thus, psychological and physiological changes occur with the 
aging of CEOs, a situation that translates into changes in CEO human capital (Kovalchik et al. 
2005). Age often signifies more knowledge, experience, wisdom, and established social 
networks (Cohen and Dean 2005). Non-work-related life experiences also influence an 
individual ' s work-related knowledge and abilities over time (Tesluk and Jacobs 1998). A 
strong positive relationship between age and knowledge level exists (Kanfer and Ackerman 
2004). As CEOs age, they are therefore likely to accumulate more knowledge and work 
experiences, thereby enhancing their stores of human capital necessary to navigate and 
address new situations. 
Since the late 1980s, the increased stock ownership oflarge institutional investors has 
forced CEOs to lead their companies' investor relations efforts, directly communicating with 
shareholders and institutions. Effectively accomplishing this responsibility necessitates that 
4 Age is correlated with CEO performance (Francis eta!. 2008). CEO compensation is largely tied to finn size. 
In addition, CEOs want to enjoy a higher level of compensation. Thus, I believe young CEOs have strong 
incentive to pursue fmn growth because they have longer career horizons and exceptional charisma or 
leadership skills that characterize those who become CEOs at a young age. Physiological or psychological 
changes can also diminish the inclination of older CEOs to pursue fmn growth. I present evidence that CEO 
human capital have direct causal effects on fmn growth and strategic policies. 
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CEOs be experts in communicating with both print and broadcast media outfits. Previous 
literature (Milbourn 2003; Rajgopal et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2008) has used CEO reputation 
in both print and broadcast media as a proxy for general human capital. Malmendier and 
Tate (2009) argue that a CEO can be regarded as a celebrity when he/she satisfies investors' 
and analysts' expectations on future firm performance. The more often this feat is 
accomplished, the greater the increase in celebrity status. Reputed CEOs are considered 
capable of avoiding profit losses because they have more human capital than CEOs without 
established reputations. If reputed CEOs misjudge business opportunities, then they have 
more to lose (Francis et al. 2008). CEOs are concerned about how their performance affects 
the long-term value of their human capital or reputation in the executive labor market (Fama 
1980), in addition to how it affects their compensation. Previous research gives rise to the 
interesting issue of how CEOs build their reputations; CEOs with strong general human 
capital are more likely to care about such reputations. 
2.2.3 Firm-specific Human Capital 
Numerous studies have estimated the effect of firm-specific human capital on 
individual wage growth (Altonji and Shakotko 1987; Altonji and Williams 2005). Firm-
specific capital develops from understanding an organization's unique context, history, 
culture, personnel, capabilities, and weaknesses (Bailey and Helfat 2003). Although general 
human capital increases firm productivity in a similar manner, how a CEO's innate general 
human capital fits into a firm upon hiring remains uncertain. By definition, firm-specific 
human capital makes CEOs more productive only in the firms that they currently work for, 
indicating that firm-specific human capital does not affect CEO productivity in other firms 
and is non-transferable. This differentiation between general and firm-specific human capital 
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is important in understanding job mobility behavior, performance, and CEO wage growth 
(Altonji and Williams 2005). I consider three different attributions of fum-specific human 
capital: family ownership, nature of hiring, and tenure. In what follows, I discuss how these 
attributions are associated with compensation. 
Family members (founders, descendants, and relatives) control36% ofS&P 500 firms 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003). Thus, families own and control a considerable number of 
publicly held firms . Similarly, family ownership is considerable in private-owned firms. 
Therefore, family CEOs possess substantial firm-specific human capital. They have an in-
depth understanding of a firm's history, personnel, culture, internal strengths, and weaknesses, 
thereby limiting their value outside the firm. These CEOs more strongly affect decision-
making on firm performance than do externally hired CEOs. For example, family CEOs 
perform better than do other CEOs because they derive considerable personal satisfaction 
from the success of the firm (James et al. 1997; Palia and Ravid 2002) and face higher levels 
of potential dishonor should the firm fail (Kandel and Lazear 1992). The loyalty established 
with key family stakeholders is also more easily transferred to family CEOs (Donnelley 
1964). An additional benefit of family CEOs is that by virtue of constant exposure to the 
day-to-day business of the firm, they have more firm-specific human capital than do outsiders 
(Donnelley 1964). Anderson and Reeb (2004) find a positive correlation between founding 
family ownership and firm profitability and MIB ratios; the authors also find a positive 
correlation between these performance measures and family CEOs, contingent on family 
ownership. These statistical findings indicate that the family characteristics of family CEOs 
are highly closely related to firm-specific human capital. 
With regard to the match between the human capital of external CEO candidates and a 
firm ' s needs, information asymmetry affects the choice between internal promotion and 
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external hiring (Bailey and Helfat 2003). Such an effect is driven by the notion that internal 
candidates with better firm-specific human capital are more strongly perceived as having the 
human capital necessary to become CEOs than are external candidates (Milbourn 2003; Rose 
and Shepard 1994). Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Agarwal and Knoeber (2001) find 
evidence that firms optimally choose directors on the basis of firm-specific characteristics 
because such directors know their firms' internal strengths and weaknesses. This choice 
implies that if promoted CEOs come from within firms, their firm-specific human capital 
potentially has more value than that of externally hired CEOs. In addition, if externally hired 
CEOs have no job experience in the industries where the current firm operates, then the new 
externally hired CEOs lack firm-specific human capital. In sum, a CEO's nature of hiring is 
an important indicator of firm-specific human capital. 
The length of CEO tenure within a firm enables a CEO to better understand the firm's 
history, employees, culture, internal strengths, and weakness. Thus, CEO tenure can be 
viewed as a determinant of firm-specific human capital. As CEO tenure within a firm 
increases, CEOs not only acquire knowledge ofthe firm's cultural tendencies and weaknesses, 
but also understand top-level executives' personalities and potential for opportunism 
(Rajgopal et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2008). 
Finally, previous theoretical and empirical studies elucidate the effect of firm size on 
changes in CEO compensation package (Rosen 1982, 1992). The current study explores the 
empirical relationship among the scope of CEO human capital, the extent to which a firm 
engages in a diverse set of businesses, and a firm's CEO compensation schemes. This 
relationship is important because firm size is expected to be related to CEO human capital. 
Lambert et al. (1991) find a statistically significant but considerably small correlation 
between changes in top management compensation and firm size. The literature reveals 
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various rationales for this association. First, large firms are more willing to compensate 
CEOs because many difficulties confront the management oflarge firms. Second, boards may 
agree to hire CEOs who expand firm size and justify higher pay on the basis of greater 
managerial demands or because the· complicated management of a large firm requires greater 
skill. Gabaix and Landier (2008) provide evidence that CEOs with strong human capital seek 
employment at large firms because they can add more firm value. CEOs are paid more as 
companies expand, suggesting that changes in CEO compensation schemes depend both on 
changes in firm size and the extent of firm diversification. Thus, firm size can be a indicator 
of CEO human capital. 
2.3 Compensation Schemes 
CEO compensation schemes are relevant to assessing the level of CEO human capital 
that incumbents carry to a firm (Agarwal 1981 ). Some scholars suggest that CEO equity-
based pay is more important than CEO cash-based pay, accounting for nearly 90% of a 
CEO's total compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). By contrast, agency theory scholars 
argue that because equity-based pay is tied to finn outcomes that are only partly linked to 
managerial risk preference, such compensation may shift excessive risk onto already under-
diversified managers (Beatty and Zajac 1994; Eisenhardt 1989). These scholars contend that 
high proportions of equity-based pay are unrelated to CEO human capital. Rather, such 
proportions are related to a CEO's risk aversion and fortuitous decisions, which lead to 
preferences that reduce managerial risk, such as pay-risk sensitivity (Amihud and Lev 1981; 
Huddart and Lang 1996). 
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Compensation committees generally provide CEOs a premium of additional cash-based 
pay on top of increases in equity-based pay (Murphy 1999). Among compensation schemes, 
cash-based pay is intuitively a good measure of a CEO's human capital. Agency theory 
scholars also suggest that cash-based pay is an efficient sorting mechanism for attracting and 
retaining CEO talent (Hall and Murphy 2003; Murphy and Zabojnik 2004). Among 
compensation schemes, therefore, cash-based pay is a factor that should be considered in 
evaluating CEO human capital. 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Despite efforts by the SEC to improve the reportage of CEO characteristics and CEO 
human capital in financial statements, many firms disclose little about their CEOs. This 
research is motivated by the beliefthat an improved understanding of CEO human capital can 
lead to more effective firm decisions and performance. A firm's human capital should be the 
most important source of the central considerations in formulating firm decisions, upon 
which the firm can frame its strategy; it should also be a primary driver of profitability (Grant 
1991). In his survey of95 United Kingdom CEOs, Hall (1992) concludes that the relative 
contribution of each human capital spells business success. To the best of my knowledge, no 
study in the US has examined the role of CEO human capital in a firm's decisions on value-
enhancing activities. 
2.4.1 CEO Human Capital and Compensation Schemes 
Human capital theory provides a model for predicting how CEO human capital leads to 
efficient activities for compensation schemes (Becker 1964; Agarwal 1981). To gain an 
understanding of how CEOs maximize firm value with different types ofhuman capital and 
how they acquire additional compensation for performance research, I raise the following 
overarching research question: 
What CEO human capital-induced effects on human capital and compensation 
schemes have not been identified in the literature? 
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To answer this question, I take CEO human capital as an exogenous parameter, and draw on 
economic theory (human capital theory) and social science theory (upper echelon theory) to 
develop my hypotheses. 
Previous empirical studies primarily examine the relationship between the level of 
CEO compensation and firm performance (e.g., Ross 1973; Mirrlees 1976; Holmstrom 1979). 
Many ofthese studies reveal mixed relationships between the aforementioned factors (e.g., 
Jensen and Murphy 1990; Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Murphy 1999; Gaver and Gaver 1998; 
Core and Guay 1999; Bushman and Smith 2001; Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker 2003; Murphy 
and Oyer 2003), but do not investigate the interaction between CEO human capital and CEO 
compensation schemes in relation to firm performance. 
That pay-for-performance sensitivity does not fully explain the complete framework of 
CEO compensation is not a surprising finding (Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, and 
Yammarino 2000; Bebchuck, Grinstein, and Peyer 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009) 
because firm performance is a function of executives' decisions and human capital (Yermack 
1997). To fill the gap in pay-for-performance research, firms must weigh the necessary 
attributes that CEO human capital contributes to firm performance and value-enhancing 
activities. Upper echelon theory helps explain the influence of a CEO on organizational 
development, thereby reflecting the importance of CEO human capital to a firm (Boal and 
Hooijberg 2001; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hillier and Mccolgan 2009). According to this 
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theory, a CEO has different types ofhuman capital that affect a firm's characteristics. Libby 
and Luft (1993) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) propose a model ofhow ability, experience, 
and knowledge (human capital attributes) interact to influence the of compensation and 
decision performance of a firm CEO. A CEO who makes good decisions, such as increasing 
shareholder wealth, should be rewarded with compensation. Presumably, they more than 
likely increase their human capital as they make such decisions. In sum, firms must be 
conscious of intangible factors because CEOs are compensated by both pay and increases in 
accumulated human capital. Such intangible factors include the quality of a firm's 
products/services, employees, competition in the market, and the satisfaction of service 
quality as affected by CEO human capital. 
Recent research points to a need to expand the research agenda related to the effects of 
human capital. Graham et al. (201 0) find that CEO human capital explains most of the 
variations in total CEO compensation. Kaplan et al. (2011) also show that CEO human 
capital is an important factor associated with firm performance and equity compensation. 
These studies imply that the compensation schemes of firms serve as screening devices for 
attracting and retaining CEOs with strong human capital; such devices are important to 
guaranteeing firm performance (with the intent to resolve adverse selection problems). 
Human capital theory holds that firms should be willing to pay high compensation to 
attract more talented CEOs, whose strong human capital improves performance and increases 
firm value. Murphy and Zabojnik (2008) find that CEOs who are perceived as having strong 
human capital receive high total compensation. Spence (1973) reveals that compensation 
schemes are associated with human capital indicators, such as professional background or 
education, which are reflective of a CEO's ability to manage an organization. Human capital 
theory therefore predicts that executives are rewarded a premium for their superior skill sets. 
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Indicators that reflect general human capital are also indicative of a CEO's innate 
ability because general human capital is developed in various organizations across periods 
(Holmstrom 1979). This finding implies that a compensation scheme is an increasing 
function of its ratio with respect to a CEO's general expertise in the labor market. Thus, 
general expertise is appreciated in the labor market because a CEO's performance is 
rewarded with future increases in compensation. Conversely, a CEO who performs poorly is 
not rewarded. Given this backdrop, I expect general human capital to be positively 
associated with fixed pay (reservation wage level) because a CEO's compensation scheme is 
hedged by fixed pay, which is reflective of a CEO's desire for low-risk compensation. A 
CEO may also be reluctant to leave a position of relative security without guarantee of payoff 
compensation. In sum, a high fixed pay is a tool for attracting and retaining CEOs with 
strong general human capital. I test whether the composition of general human capital is a 
determinant of fixed compensation. 
Previous studies indicate that compensation contingent on performance plays a more 
significant role in knowledge-based firms, such as information technology (IT), biological, 
and chemical firms, than in traditional firms because although general human capital tends to 
be transferable, firm-specific human capital is unlikely to be transferred across firms 
(Murphy and Zabojnik 2008; Ittner et al. 2003). CEOs with firm-specific expertise have little 
bargaining power in the labor market given that such expertise may not be readily applicable 
in another firm. Consequently, incentive pay is correlated with numerous firm-specific 
abilities. I therefore contend that CEOs with more firm-specific expertise are more willing to 
receive higher levels of contingent pay. 
In this regard, CEOs with more general expertise should have high fixed pay and those 
with more firm-specific expertise should receive high incentive pay. I postulate that different 
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monitoring incentives and capabilities correspond with CEOs' general and firm-specific 
expertise; thus, each type of human capital has different effects on CEO compensation 
schemes. On the basis of these differences, I expect CEOs to enhance their general expertise 
in relation to fixed compensation and their firm-specific expertise in relation to incentive 
compensation. The discussion above is summarized in the first hypothesis set: 
HI a: General human capital increases fixed CEO compensation (salary 
compensation), but not bonus compensation (contingent compensation). 
HI b: Firm-specific human capital increases bonus compensation (contingent 
compensation), but not fixed compensation (salary compensation). 
To validate the hypothesis set, I regress CEO compensation on human capital variables and 
firm characteristic variables as follows: 
Log (Salary) ;1 =flo+ fJuFirms Characteristics;1 + fJ2;HumanCapitalu + /]3Year Controlu + 
fJdndustry Control;1 + fJ5Firms Control;1 + £ --- l(A) 
Log(Bonus) ;1 =flo+ fJ1;Firms Characteristics;1 + /J2;HumanCapitalu + f33Year Controlit + 
fJ,Jndustry Control;1 + f35Firms Control;t + £ --1 (B) 
I expect the variables that reflect general (firm-specific) human capital to have a 
positive effect on fixed (contingent) CEO compensation. 
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2.4.2 Outsider Human Capital and Compensation Schemes 
Labor economics literature has recently revealed that general human capital has 
become increasingly crucial to corporate decisions. The literature also suggests that 
compared with internally promoted CEOs, externally hired CEOs are expected to carry more 
general expertise. Huson et al. (2001) provide that outside succession has increased in the 
mid-1990s compared with the early 1970s. Similarly, Khurana (2002) provides evidence that 
in the 1990s, at least one-third of all CEO successions in large firms are outside successions. 
In October 2009, the SEC responded to these issues by issuing SLB 14E, which requires 
companies to disclose the proposal for a CEO succession process, including CEO 
characteristics and corporate strategic policies. In general, this policy means that the SEC 
allows for the scrutiny of corporate governance as regulators and shareholders focus on CEO 
succession. The disclosure of a firm's CEO succession process for an internally promoted or 
externally hired CEO is important to the firm's human capital and compensation schemes. In 
terms of outside succession, Bertrand and Scholar (2003) indicate that CEOs have high 
general expertise, which they carry as they change firms. The authors also find that general 
human capital is important to firm performance and compensation schemes because firm-
specific human capital is inapplicable to other firms when CEOs move. 
If a CEO's expertise is largely firm-specific, he/she finds limited outside job 
opportunities because general expertise more strongly corresponds with greater executive job 
demands (Hambrick 2007). Thus, the CEO is in an inferior bargaining position, and 
therefore belongs under a low reservation wage classification (Jensen 1993; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003). The learning hypothesis about CEO human capital (Murphy 1986) holds that 
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CEOs' firm-specific managerial expertise increases as tenure increases because a firm's 
environment is less transparent. That is, an internally promoted CEO with considerably firm-
specific expertise prefers to receive incentive pay because he/she has longer tenure and more 
firm-specific expertise. 
I model initial compensation premium for external versus internal hiring of CEOs as a 
tradeoff between general and firm-specific skills. Rose and Shepard ( 1994) show that 
externally hired CEOs receive lower salaries and bonuses than do internally promoted CEOs. 
Their finding is consistent with fat cat theory, 5 which states that internally promoted CEOs 
earn more than do externally hired CEOs because the former have closer ties with their 
companies' boards of directors (BODs). Murphy and Zabojnik (2008) find contrasting 
results. That is, externally hired CEOs earn approximately 15.3% more than internally 
promoted CEOs. This premium for external hires has also increased over time, from 6.5% in 
the 1970s to 17.2% in the 1980s and to 21.6% in the 1990s. Malmendier and Tate (2009) 
find that the strong human capital of CEOs from outside firms is often associated with 
inferior future operating and stock performance. Thus, general human capital tends to 
produce an initial fixed pay premium for an externally hired CEO in the form of non-
contingent pay because other forms of pay inadequately compensate an externally hired CEO 
for the increased risk of inferior future performance. Such a CEO is likely to negotiate pay 
packages and attempt to secure fixed pay when he/she is hired because he/she has more 
substantial general expertise, placing him in the best bargaining position. 
The CEO succession process of a firm is likely to influence the compensation schemes 
established by the firm in the event that the CEO candidate does not work out. Therefore, 
contingent pay increases the downside risk of potential poor firm performance by the 
5 Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), "Fat cats feeding: Executive pay," The Economist, 11 October 2003, p. 64. 
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externally hired CEO because of lack of firm-specific expertise. Guaranteed fixed pay can 
compensate an externally hired CEO for the same reason. I posit that externally hired CEOs 
have greater general expertise than do internally promoted CEOs. Thus, the nature of 
external CEO hiring is positively associated with general human capital and positively affects 
compensation level. I hypothesize that: 
H2a: Newly hired external CEOs are more likely to receive higher fixed 
compensation than are new internally promoted CEOs. 
Black and Lynch ( 1996) find that when workers' change areas of expertise, their 
accumulated human capital can be inferior to that of other workers in these new fields. By 
extension, ifCEOs change industries, their accumulated human capital becomes the general 
type (instead of firm-specific), which can affect the growth ofthe firm to which the CEO 
transferred. However, the results on CEO successions are mixed for CEOs who are 
externally hired to replace poorly performing CEOs. That is, those who switch industries are 
more likely to bring low general expertise to new jobs. In this case, the externally hired CEO 
who switches industries loses not only the future benefits that he/she can derive from 
previous firm-specific expertise but also those stemming from general expertise that is 
applicable within the industry. Specifically, changing industries can affect CEOs who work 
in knowledge-based sectors, such as the finance, IT, biology, and chemical industries 
(Malmendier and Tate 2009). On this basis, I develop the following hypothesis: 
H2b: New externally hired CEOs transferring from the same industry are more likely 
to receive higher base compensation than those transferring from another industry. 
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To verify H2b, I add the indicator variables "external hires" and "industrial changes" to the 
original models. I expect external hires (industrial changes) to have a positive (negative) 
influence on fixed CEO compensation. Therefore, CEOs with strong general expertise have 
high fixed compensation (Hla and H2a) and CEOs with strong firm-specific expertise have 
high incentive compensation (H 1 b and H2b ). 
Log(salary) ;1 =flo+ fJ,ExternalHires;1 + fJ2IndustryChangeu + fJ3;Firms 
Characteristics;1 + fJ4;HumanCapitalu + fJ5Year Controlil + fJrJndustry Controlit + e 
---(2) 
2.4.3 CEO Human Capital, Innovation, and Firm Growth 
R&D and innovation are two of the most critical decisions that must be addressed by a 
CEO. These activities considerably influence future firm growth over the long run (Scheerer 
1984). Moreover, innovation performance is driven by the CEO, whose compensation 
schemes are affected by the success of a firm's investments. The literature documents that 
R&D spending represents value-enhancing investments and therefore positively affects future 
operating income because such spending accounts for 21% of the total expenses of S&P 500 
firms (Lev and Sougiannis 1996). Barker and Mueller (2002) examine the relationship 
between CEO background and R&D spending. The authors find that CEO education does 
not affect R&D spending but that considerable increases in R&D spending are found in firms 
with CEOs who have a science degree. Some previous studies examine how CEOs influence 
R&D spending and show that firm performance is affected by the quality of CEO expertise in 
relation to R&D and innovation (Murphy and Zimmerman 1993). These studies indicate that 
weak innovation performance is affected by only weak internal governance or irrational 
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managerial optimism (Jensen 1993). To the best of my knowledge, no research has examined 
the effect of CEO human capital on innovation performance. 
Upper echelon theory maintains that a CEO has the organizational power to influence 
R&D spending because he/she is the central strategic decision maker. The theory predicts 
that a CEO with an R&D background would invest more heavily in R&D; the rationale for 
such a decision is that the most important human capital plays a critical role in creating and 
sustaining firm growth. However, an equally plausible situation is that a firm that invests 
heavily in R&D hires a CEO with an R&D background. On the basis of this result, we 
cannot determine a clear indication of whether R&D investment decisions necessarily depend 
on CEO human capital (Hambrick 2007). Furthermore, although firm performance around 
the time of CEO turnover, quality of governance, and a CEO's decision policies on 
innovation performance have received attention from previous research, the effect of CEO 
human capital on innovation performance has not been previously studied. I therefore 
ascertain whether examining the significant associations between CEO human capital and 
R&D spending is an effective initial approach. 
Barker and Mueller (2002) show that general CEO human capital- specifically R&D 
career, marketing career, and educational degree- positively affect R&D innovation 
performance. Because researchers have used R&D expenses as a proxy for firm innovation 
(Titman and Wessels 1988; Chan et al. 2001; Barker and Muller 2002), my analysis focuses 
on R&D expenses devoted to firm innovation. I also distinguish between general human 
capital and firm-specific human capital in relation to innovation performance. Frydman 
(2007) states that general human capital is more important than firm-specific human capital 
for firms because firms develop in a complex manner and environments considerably change 
in the long term. On this basis, I fonnulate the following hypothesis: 
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H3a: CEOs 'general human capital is positively associated with R&D expenses. 
Agency theory suggests that CEOs prefer less work and suboptimally invest in 
innovation performance, even though compensation schemes and turnover are intended to 
mitigate these behaviors. Career concerns can also alleviate agency problems. A CEO who 
has worked for his/her current employer for a long period and has more firm-specific human 
capital is expected to infuse more investments into innovation than are other CEOs. This 
position is accurate even though most firms prefer to hire CEOs with strong general human 
capital (Fama 1980). Learning on the job during a CEO's tenure encourages the CEO to 
invest in his/her abilities, a behavior that further enables him/her to expand his/her firm-
specific human capital. A CEO with firm-specific human capital is more likely to pursue 
relatively risky R&D and innovation activities because he/she is familiar with a firm's unique 
context, history, culture, personnel, capabilities, and weaknesses (Bailey and Helfat 2003). 
Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3b: CEOs 'firm-specific human capital is positively associated with R&D activities. 
H3b is tested by the following model: 
iJR&D/Sales ;1 =flo+ fJ!iFirmsCharacteristics;,+ fJ2!:J.R&D/Sales;,_, + fJJ;HumanCapital;, + 
fJ4 Year Controlu + /]5/ndustry Control;,+ fJd'irms Control;, + c 
CEOs are always confronted with difficult choices and conflicting demands from 
shareholders and investors. They often feel isolated, unable to share their problems and 
---(3) 
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concerns with board members or their leadership team without fear of negative emotions. 
CEOs must be able to direct their firms toward long-term growth and in creating firm value to 
achieve sustained success. 
The literature indicates that management affects firm growth through managerial 
decisions (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; 
Murphy and Zabojnik 2007; Aivazian et al. 2011). The implication of these studies is that the 
optimal managerial decisions made by CEOs increase firm growth through CEO human 
capital perspectives. The influence of CEO human capital on managerial decisions affects 
firm growth and value creation because CEOs determine decisions regarding appropriate 
long-term projects, such as R&D initiatives. This influence indicates that the adequate 
managerial decisions made by CEOs are crucial to the viability and success of firms in many 
industries. The suboptimal managerial decisions made by CEOs translate to impaired long-
term growth and value creation. Thus, the levels of CEO human capital affect optimal 
managerial decisions on firm growth. 
As discussed above, the role of human capital in expanding firms increases with the 
challenge and complexity of managerial tasks in a firm. Specifically, upper echelon theory 
suggests that CEO characteristics affect how CEOs assess or interpret their situations, and 
therefore influence their decisions regarding firm operations. Little research has provided 
evidence on the correlations between various types of managerial human capital and 
corporate decisions regarding firm growth. Examples include the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and corporate investment (Malmendier and Tate 2005), and that among 
superstar CEOs, firms, and growth (Malmendier and Tate 2009). 
Firms with more growth opportunities require managerial human capital that focuses 
on making the right investments. Frydman (2007) implies that general human capital is key 
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to investing in favorable projects as firms develop. As stated in the career concern hypothesis 
of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), CEOs pursue various careers throughout firm growth by 
establishing their reputations in different firms with more general human capital. CEOs who 
possess firm-specific human capital and long-term perspectives may also significantly affect 
firm growth in the long run. Examining future stock price performance can be problematic 
because markets anticipate future performance. In validating these hypotheses, sales growth 
and book-to-market are more relevant to growth opportunities than are profitability measures, 
such as income measures or accounting returns. Thus, my fourth hypothesis set is stated as 
follows: 
H4a: CEOs 'general human capital is associated with growth opportunities. 
H4b: CEOs 'firm-specific human capital is associated with growth opportunities. 
Here, 
Log(Sales;1 / Sales it-t)= fJo + fJuHumanCapitalit + fJ2;HumanCapital;t* log(Salesit-t /Salesit-2) 
+jJ3;FirmsCharactisticsit + fJ4Year Control;1 + fJslndustry Control;t + + c 
--- ( 4) 
2.4.4 General CEO Human Capital and Selling, General, and Administrative Costs 
SG&A costs are potentially important indicators because the SG&A cost ratio 
accounts for more than 28% of sales revenue for the sample firms used in this study; the ratio 
of SG&A costs to sales is also closely monitored by investors and analysts (Wild, 
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Subramanyam, and Halsey 2003). Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) argue that SG&A costs 
include most of the expenditures that generate organizational capital. Abarbanell and Bushee 
( 1997) reveal that the interpretation of increases (decreases) in the SG&A cost ratio is 
considered an unfavorable (favorable) indicator of changes in future earnings. Since the 
corporate accounting scandals in 2001 such as Enron and WorldCom, most firms have cut 
costs as much as possible. History indicates that firms with high gross margins tend to spend 
more on SG&A than do their counterparts in similar industries. Although some SG&A costs 
drive gross margin improvement (e.g., infrastructure improvements), many firms likely 
overspend on SG&A. As one of the largest expense pools for any firm, SG&A represents a 
key opportunity to improve bottom-line performance. A 5% reduction in SG&A for the 
companies in the sample would result in an average increase in operating profits ofUS$175 
million. Optimizing the SG&A cost ratio is consistently a topic ofboardroom discussions. 
The effects of the lack of adequate human capital attributes, such as insufficient 
leadership, inability to overcome internal politics, inadequate management, and inability to 
strike the right balance, provide an important explanation for SG&A cost overruns. This 
explanation is particularly notable among firms where SG&A costs create low future value 
(Banker, Huang, and Natarajan 2011). Because SG&A costs capture most overhead costs, 
CEOs with weak human capital are more likely to increase SG&A costs too rapidly when 
sales increases or vice versa. Such human capital causes SG&A costs to veer from optimal 
levels and incurs greater SG&A costs. 
I extend my analysis by estimating an SG&A cost model that incorporates various 
elements of CEO human capital. The fifth research hypothesis examines the role of general 
CEO human capital in mitigating the effect of overspending on SG&A. The general 
consensus is that SG&A costs affect a firm's future value and performance; a CEO's general 
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human capital plays a more important role than does firm-specific human capital in a firm's 
future value (Frydman 2007). A CEO's human capital highly likely drives SG&A costs to 
optimal levels from suboptimal levels. Increases in the SG&A cost ratio are treated as 
evidence that resources are used less efficiently and that CEOs are unable to effectively 
control costs, whereas decreases in this ratio are applauded by investors and analysts 
(Abarbanell and Bushee 1997). My research complements the literature in that it shows that 
human capital can also be a factor in SG&A costs. In sum, I predict that general human 
capital reduces the SG&A cost ratio. In this regard, I posit the following hypothesis: 
H5: The SG&A cost ratio is negatively associated with general CEO human capital, 
after known firm determinants are controlled for. 
Here, 
Log (SG&A;, I Salesii /SG&Au-J I Sales;,_,)= fJo + fJ,log(Salesit /Salesit-1) + /32; 
GeneralHumanCapitalu + /33; GeneralHumanCapitalu* log(Salesit /Sales it-f)+ /34; 
FirmsCharactistics;1 + f35Year Control;,+ /36/ndustry Control;r + c --- (5) 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarizes the relevant literature, as well as presents the theoretical 
framework of this study and identifies previous research findings that support the hypotheses 
validated in this dissertation. Previous studies on human capital and performance 
measurements (Barker and Mueller 2002; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Frydman 2010; Kaplan 
et al. 2011; Aivazian et al. 2011) reflect the perspective that human capital is the most 
important factor in strategic firm policies and long-term firm value. Human capital theory 
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(Becker 1962, 1993; Murphy 1986; Tesluk and Jacobs 1998) and upper echelon theory 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; Teece et al. 1997) are used as the theoretical foundations of the 
present work. This study provides support for human capital theory in relation to CEOs and 
upper echelon theory. As presented in the hypotheses, this study aims to examine whether 
human capital leads to greater compensation schemes and drives firm decisions on value-
enhancing investments, and whether human capital affects future firm performance (Lev and 
Sougiannis 1996). The details are provided in Figure 1. Table 4 summarizes the empirical 
predictions based on the literature review. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here.] 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
The next chapter discusses the methodology, which includes the research design, 
empirical measurements, and empirical tests. The manual data collection process is also 
discussed. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This study aims to provide an understanding of CEO human capital-related factors that 
influence compensation schemes and strategic firm decisions. Following previous research 
on human capital and firm performance, I use human capital as basis for analyzing firm 
decisions. I hypothesize that CEO human capital serves as an endogenous variable for firms . 
After controlling for the standard economic determinants of compensation, I find that the 
proxies for CEO human capital are positively related to firm outcomes, which is consistent 
with the idea that strong human capital improves firm outcomes. I measure CEO human 
capital using two sets of proxies: ( 1) general human capital (characteristics of CEO 
professional profiles and educational levels) and (2) firm-specific human capital (outcomes of 
CEOs' actions in current employment). At the end of this chapter, the sample and data 
sources are described and the measurements of CEO human capital are provided. 
3.2 Sample 
This study uses 2001- 2009 data on S&P 500 companies; that is, 3,364 CEO-firm-year 
observations for 653 different CEOs. The data are collected from various sources. Some are 
extracted from databases and others are hand collected. 
CEO compensation data are collected from the ExecuComp database. Annual 
compensation is defined as the value of a compensation package in a given year and is the 
sum of an executive's salary, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, grant-value of restricted 
stock awards, and Black- Scholes value of granted options. To adjust for inflation, I calculate 
all monetary figures in accordance with the 2001 US dollar rate. For the sample firms, I 
obtain financial statement data from Compustat and stock return data from CRSP. For the 
CEOs, I obtain data on CEO characteristics from ExecuComp. I supplement the merged 
Compustat/CRSP data with manual searches of SEC proxies and 1 0-K files. 
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I expect several attributes of CEOs' lifetime experiences to capture the outcomes of 
their managerial human capital. Given that none of the publicly available databases measure 
CEO human capital, I focus on the CEOs' educational backgrounds and employment 
histories. I manually obtain the variables of CEO human capital from the Mergent Online, 
Hoover's, EDGAR system, and NNDB databases, as well as from BoardEX. I match the 
CEO information obtained from Compustat (US firms) and the hand-collected data to obtain 
the characteristics of the firms where the CEOs worked. As expected, high levels of human 
capital are reflected in strong human capital. Frydman (201 0) includes only CEOs' education 
and occupational experience, whereas I consider job experience across firms and industries, 
in addition to educational degrees. In particular, the variables in this research focus on CEO 
lifetime experiences, which are strongly related to the quality of externally hired CEOs 
(Murphy and Zabojnik 2004, 2008). 
Using the data that I hand-collected from LexisNexis, Factiva, Mergent Online, and 
Google, I measure CEO reputation (one type of general human capital) as the manner by 
which CEOs are assessed by the media; that is, the number of articles containing a CEO's 
name and company affiliations that appear in major US and global newspapers and 
newswires in a calendar year. The major US newspapers considered in this study are the 
Wall Street Journal (both weekday and Sunday editions), the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and USA Today. The major international newspapers considered are the 
Financial Times, the Asian Wall Street Journal, Wall Street Journal Europe, and the 
International Herald Tribune. Data are collected for each year from 2001 to 2009, during 
which the targeted CEO was in his/her position. In this study, press coverage can be 
restricted to coverage of the CEOs and not necessarily the firms. 
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Table 1 describes the summary statistics of the compensation, CEO human capital, and 
firm characteristics of the sample. The table in the Appendix provides the definitions and 
data sources of all the variables. The CEOs in the sample receive an average of US$1 0 
million in total compensation, which includes US$0.93 million in bonuses and $0.87 million 
in salaries. The CEOs have 7.8 years of CEO experience and 4.6 different job positions in 
two different firms. They have 5.8 years ' experience as BOD members. They have obtained 
master's degrees in two disciplines. They are, on average, 55 years old and spend 6.8 years 
in a given CEO position. About 28% of the CEOs were externally hired and 17.3% work for 
their own companies. All the variables are Winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
[Insert Table 1 around here.] 
Aside from the CEO characteristics for firm-specific human capital (tenure, internal 
hires, founder), I measure some CEO attributes for general human capital: CEO age, career 
path, number of firms, general work experience dummy, experience as a BOD member, 
educational field, educational level, the age at which the CEO first assumed this position, and 
reputation. In the tests, I also control for firm characteristics, such as stock return, sales, 
Tobin's Q, ROA, leverage, R&D, CAPEX, loss, growth, and diversification dummy. 
Table 2 shows CEO human capital over the studied period. General human capital and 
finn-specific human capital steadily increase over time. The table shows a significant 
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increase in compensation schemes over the studied period. Aside from measuring CEO 
human capital, I also measure other CEO attributes: external hires and industry changes. 
Within my analysis, external hires is reflected by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO 
was externally hired, and 0 otherwise (i.e., internally promoted). Industry change is also a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO was hired from an industry that differs from that 
where the current firms belong, as determined by the four-digit SIC code; this dummy has a 
value of 0 otherwise. 
[Insert Table 2 around here.] 
Figure 2 shows the time series observations of changes in externally appointed CEOs 
from 2001 to 2009. The number of appointed CEOs belonging to outside firms and industries 
increases over time, indicating that firms are more likely to hire externally than promote 
within firms. This result can account for the increased demand for managers with strong 
general human capital. This finding is also consistent with CEOs having more general 
human capital, which is more transferable across firms and industries than firm-specific 
human capital. 
[Insert Figure 2 around here.] 
Figure 3 presents the average years of CEO work experience, experience as a BOD 
member, and tenure in the current CEO position from 2001 to 2009. The figure shows the 
increasing importance of experience as a component of general managerial human capital 
with time during the sample period. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here.] 
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Figure 4 presents other general CEO human capital attributes from 2001 to 2009. As 
previously stated, general CEO human capital increase over time (Figure 4). The number of 
career paths, educational fields, and reputation increase over the research period. Educational 
level, however, increases up to 2004, then decreases and slightly increases before plateauing 
over the last three years. That CEOs acquire education from various disciplines is not a 
surprising result. Figure 4 also shows the importance of general managerial human capital in 
recent decades. 
[Insert Figure 4 around here.] 
Table 3 shows average compensation scheme and average human capital by industry. 
I find significant variations across industries in terms of general managerial human capital 
and in terms of the differences in pay schemes between general human capital (generalist) 
CEOs and firm-specific human capital (specialist) CEOs. The telecom service industry has 
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the highest average level of general CEO human capital. This field attaches importance to 
reputation and educational level; at the same time, it is the industry where CEOs receive the 
highest average total pay (US$1 0.6 million) and highest average total salary (US$1.1 million) . 
Moreover, the telecom industry shows the largest number of externally hired CEOs. The 
CEOs in the telecom industry are therefore generalists. This result may be attributed to the 
fact that this industry rapidly changed with the deregulation of telecommunications in the 
2000s. The rapid increase in competition based on technological innovation can increase the 
demand for managers with general human capital. 
[Insert Table 3 around here.] 
3.3 Empirical Measurements of CEO Human Capital 
A major empirical challenge for a study on the relationship between CEO human 
capital and outcomes (such as firm growth, enhancement activities, and CEO compensation 
schemes) is guaranteeing the accurate measurement of CEO human capital. Simple measures, 
such as CEO age, experience, tenure in the firm, and educational background, are commonly 
used as proxies for CEO human capital in univariate analysis. For example, Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2008) argue that the decline in CEO tenure in a firm (as a proxy for CEOs' firm-
specific skills) and the increase in the proportion ofCEOs with master's degrees (as a proxy 
for CEOs' general human capital) in recent years support their assumption that general CEO 
skills have become relatively more important than firm-specific skills. Frydman (20 1 0) 
collects data about executives' biographical information, including education and career 
paths, for use as an index of executive general human capital. She argues that this index is 
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positively associated with the increasing importance of general human capital, and uses it to 
explain the increasing wage inequality among top managers within firms. Graham et al. 
(2010) also construct their measure by classifying executive compensation into firm-specific 
and general compensation. They argue that hiring CEOs with large fixed compensation 
schemes improves firm performance. 
My goal is to determine whether the relative importance of general human capital has 
exceeded that of firm-specific human capital in firm financial performance and decisions on 
enhancing activities over recent years. To this end, I consider eight proxies for general CEO 
human capital. Human capital is generally perceived as a distinctive approach to managing 
people. Thus, different CEOs have various types of human capital. Each CEO has tailored 
his/her human capital development through education. Among the many possible attributes 
related to general human capital, education has been the main focus ofhuman capital 
research since the studies of Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974). Education is a good starting 
point for constructing a consistent measure. 
Jalbert et al. (2011) claim that CEOs' Ivy League degrees and MBA degrees do not 
significantly affect firm performance and total compensation. Gottesman and Morey (201 0) 
reveal that the firms managed by CEOs with MBA or law degrees perform no better than 
firms with CEOs who do not have specialized degrees. These studies indicate that a specific 
degree does not influence compensation and firm performance. Thus, the highest degree and 
the number of degrees earned by CEOs are important proxies for education in relation to 
general human capital. Some CEOs with degrees from more than one educational field are 
classified under multiple categories. 
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To include general human capital in relation to experience, I create five proxies for the 
generality of general CEO human capital. In creating these proxies, I use the CEOs' years of 
work experience6 (including that from current position and from previous to current position) 
and career paths (Neal 1995; Malmendier and Tate 2005) as bases. CEOs with various 
experiences have pursued different career paths (e.g., treasurer, sales position, and marketer) 
to increase their accumulated general human capital throughout their careers. A CEO who 
has worked for multiple firms is likely to have more general human capital throughout his 
career. A CEO who has worked in different industries would have been exposed to different 
business environments. Thus, I consider the number of years at which a CEO has held this 
position, the number of years during which the CEO has worked as a BOD member7, the 
number of career paths pursued by the CEO in past work experience, the number of firms 
where the CEO has worked, and the general work experience dummy for general human 
capital. 
Milbourn (2003), Rajgopal et al. (2006), and Francis et al. (2008) empirically proxy for 
CEO reputation as general human capital because CEO reputations reflect CEOs' social skills, 
relationships, and behaviors. Milbourn et al. (2003) find that the compensation received by 
reputed CEOs shows better pay-for-performance sensitivity. Rajgopal et al. (2006) find that 
the compensations of CEOs with strong reputations are subject to low relative performance 
evaluation. Similarly, Francis et al. (2008) find that counter-intuitively, more highly reputed 
CEOs are associated with poorer quality earnings. Because CEOs are likely to develop their 
reputations over several years, an important task is to determine the measures of a CEO's 
6 A CEO's experience as a top manager should be a proxy for CEO ability (Rajgopal eta!. 2006). Supervisory or 
managerial experience is also assessed in tem1s of number of years. Years of experience and years of 
management experience are squared and added to the equations to examine non-linear effects. 
7 The board of directors chooses a new CEO who has experience in the business of the firm and makes primary 
business decisions in the board (Harris and Helfat 1997). 
reputation for a specific year on the basis of data on several years. In line with this 
requirement, I use years from t-3 tot to reflect the reputation of a CEO fort. Given the 
mixed results in previous literature, I classify each article as favorable, neutral, or 
unfavorable with respect to the comments made about a CEO. 
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Rosen (1982) and Kremer (1993) reveal that human capital is positively correlated with 
firm size. Rosen (1982) considers a hierarchical organizational structure, in which labor 
productivity improves at any given level. The reciprocity between economies of scale and 
the loss of control associated with large organizations determines organizational size. Other 
scholars argue that CEOs exploit size to acquire high compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; 
Baker and Hall 2004). Consistent with previously published theories and empirical works 
(Rosen 1982; Smith and Watts 1992), I control firm size, expecting large firms to have 
greater growth opportunities and more complex operations as the demand for managers with 
high human capital and high equilibrium wages increases. 
Previous research examines gender differences in relation to human capital. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence on this issue is also mixed. Higgs (2003) holds that by 
itself, gender diversity increases firm value. A counter argument shows that the percentage 
of women directors on a board does not affect firm value (Farrell and Hersch 2005), or 
negatively affects firm value (Adams and Ferreira 2009); women directors are also more risk 
averse than men directors (Zingales et al. 2010). The inconsistencies in empirical results on 
gender in relation to human capital may be, at least partially, attributed to the focus on 
different types of human capital. Gender diversity with respect to human capital may depend 
on type of knowledge and skills. Therefore, gender is treated as a control variable in this 
study. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This study provides empirical results for the hypotheses on how CEO human capital 
influences firm decisions and growth. Human capital theory and upper echelon theory have 
been applied to research on CEOs; these theories suggest that CEO human capital affects firm 
decisions when it is applied to the efficient operation of a firm (Hambrick and Mason 1984; 
Murphy and Zabojnik 2008; Frydman 2010). Finally, both general human capital and firm-
specific human capital are hypothesized to influence firms. The influence ofthe attributes of 
CEO human capital is validated by hand-collected data. This chapter discusses the results of 
the primary and additional data analyses. 
4.2 Main Results 
Consistent with previous empirical research, I control for many firm characteristics 
because these attributes usually affect CEO human capital and compensation schemes. The 
results of this study are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, which control for any 
time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. Fixed-effects methods solve "joint 
determination" problems, in which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously 
determines human capital variables and CEO compensation. I also address the endogeneity 
of CEO selection, which is a concern that is likely assigned as a firm's responsibility as it 
places a premium on managerial human capital. For example, CEOs with strong human 
capital may be able to choose firms that pay more and decide on good strategic policy 
decisions. 
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Table 2 shows that the qualifications of CEOs have evolved over time. Arguably, the 
evolution shows movement from firm-specific human capital to general human capital. It 
also illustrates that the variables that represent general human capital increase, whereas those 
that denote firm-specific human capital stay relatively constant over the experimental period. 
Given recent trends (Frydman 2007, 2010), general human capital is becoming a more 
important factor than specific human capital in the CEO labor market. 
4.2.1 CEO Human Capital and Compensation Schemes 
Table 5 presents the empirical results for H 1 a and H 1 b. I run panel regressions on the 
firm fixed effects, in which the dependent variables are the logarithms of CEO salary 
compensation (columns (1)-(3)) and bonus compensation (columns (4)-(6)). Jensen and 
Murphy ( 1990) use the log change in market value as an independent variable. However, 
market value is highly correlated with firm size. To avoid size effects, Kaplan (1994) uses 
stock returns as a performance measure. I use stock retrun and ROA for the performance 
measure. I also use logarithmic returns instead of arithmetic returns because the latter are too 
asymmetrically distributed. The explanatory variables of interest in this study are human 
capital variables. The regressions include industry (two-digit SIC) and year dummies. All 
reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation using firm-
level clustered standard errors. 
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[Insert Table 5 around here.] 
Columns (1) and (2) ofTable 5 present the coefficients ofthe regression of salary 
compensation on firm characteristics. The columns differ by classification of human capital 
variables. The results show that salary compensation is negatively associated with past firm 
performance, as measured by ROA. Salary compensation exhibits a strong positive 
relationship with growth opportunities (Tobin's Q)8 after two different types of human capital 
are included. In column (1 ), the coefficient of ROA is 0.202 (t-statistics = 1.56), which is 
non-significant. The coefficient of the previous ROA is -0.194 (t-statistics = -2.17), which is 
significant. Column (3), however, shows that the coefficients of the previous and current 
periods' ROAs are -0.329 (t-statistics = -2.88 and 0.19l(t-statistics = 1.73), respectively. 
These values are significant and non-significant, respectively. These results support the idea 
that the pay-for-performance sensitivity ofROA diminishes in the base regression when the 
human capital variables are included. Thus, strong evidence of a statistically positive 
relationship between fixed pay and past performance exists. The empirical results indicate 
that the coefficients of the general human capital variables (such as reputation, years of 
experience, career path, number of firms, general career dummy, BOD experience, 
educational level, educational fields, and age at which the CEO first held this position) for 
salary compensation are all positive and significant. By contrast, the coefficients of the firm-
specific human capital variables (such as founder and tenure) are negative and nonsignificant. 
These results are consistent with the assumption that CEOs who exhibit strong general human 
capital receive a fixed pay premium. 
8 Tobin's Q (calculated as total assets (data item 6) plus market value (data item 199 x data item 25) minus 
common equity (data item 60) - deferred taxes (data item 74) divided by total assets (data item 6)) 
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Columns ( 4) and (5) in Table 5 also present the coefficients of the regression of bonus 
compensation on firm characteristics, including different human capital variables. This 
model shows that bonus compensation exhibits a negative and significant relationship with 
R&D expenditure. Column (4) shows that the coefficient ofROA is 0.096 (t-statistics = 
1.66), which is significant. The coefficient of the previous period's ROA is 0.387 (t-statistics 
= 2.36), which is highly significant. The coefficients of the regression ofbonus 
compensation on all types of human capital, including firm characteristics, are provided in 
column (6). This column shows that the coefficient ofROA is 0.182 (t-statistics = 1.86, non-
significant). The coefficient of previous ROA is 0.273 (t-statistics = 2.97, significant). These 
results support the idea that the pay-for-performance sensitivity ofROA is positively related 
to compensation and statistically significant. In addition, the pay-for-performance sensitivity 
ofROA and the previous period's ROA are both positive and significant when human capital 
variables are included. Strong evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between bonus compensation and performance is found. The empirical results show that the 
coefficients of the firm-specific human capital variables (such as founder and internal hires) 
for bonus compensation are positive and significant. By contrast, the coefficients of the 
general human capital variables (such as reputation, years of experience, number of firms, 
general work experience dummy, BOD experience, educational level, and age) are non-
significant. These results are consistent with the assumption that CEOs with strong firm-
specific human capital acquire a bonus premium. 
Using the specifications in columns (3) and (6), and consistent with Hla, I find that the 
coefficients of the general human capital variables are more likely associated with salary than 
bonus compensation. Consistent with HI b, I show that the coefficients of the firm-specific 
human capital variables are more likely related to bonus than salary compensation. Finally, I 
find that firm size is positively associated with salaries and bonuses. These results support 
the importance of separating the components of cash compensation. When cash 
compensation or total compensation is considered instead of separated salary and bonus 
compensation, significant results for the role of human capital cannot be found. These 
findings support H 1 a and H 1 b. Taken together, the findings are consistent with the human 
capital theory-based explanation of the better qualification of CEOs with different types of 
general human capital. These results further suggest that pay premiums reflect executives' 
superior managerial skills. 
4.2.2 Outsider Human Capital and Compensation Schemes 
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Many economic models of managerial behavior, including most principal-agent 
models, posit the assumption that managers are risk averse. Economic reasoning (Nicholson 
1978) implies that a risk-averse individual prefers less risk when he/she changes employment 
positions. Therefore, a risk-averse externally hired CEO requires greater fixed compensation 
than does a risk-averse internally promoted CEO because the former does not bear risks due 
to lack of firm-specific skills. More specifically, an externally hired CEO requires a pay 
premium to prompt him/her to switch firms (Murphy and Zabojnik 2008). Table 6 shows the 
panel estimation of the compensation components on firm characteristics and newly hired 
CEOs for H2a and H2b. Column (1) ofthe table presents the coefficients ofthe regression 
model based on ln(Salary). In this regression model, the coefficients of external hires is 
0.489 (t-statistics = 2.11) and that of industry changes is -0.193 (t-statistics = -2.53). These 
results support the idea that a new externally hired CEO is more likely to receive greater 
salary compensation (48%) than a new internally promoted CEO when these CEOs are 
compared with peer industry groups. 
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Column (2) presents the coefficients of the regression model based on ln(Bonus). In 
this model, the coefficient of external hires is 0.302 (t-statistics = 1.47) and that ofindustry 
changes is -0.129 (t-statistics = 1.19), consistent with H2a and H2b. I find that the 
coefficients of the external hire and industry changes dummies show a statistically significant 
relationship with salary compensation, but not with bonus compensation as I expected. For 
externally hired CEOs, some evidence indicates fixed pay premium when these CEOs are 
from the same industry where the hiring firm operates. 
[Insert Table 6 around here.] 
I assess the sensitivity of the results to the appointment of externally hired CEOs. I 
separate the externally hired and internally promoted CEOs into two groups (Table 6). The 
results for the externally hired CEOs are presented in columns (6) and (7). The relative 
significance of the coefficients of the human capital variables in columns (6) and (7) are more 
pronounced in columns (4) and (5). These results explain the demand for the strong general 
human capital that a CEO carries from one firm to another. The effect is more pronounced 
when a new CEO is externally hired because the firm is accessing the CEO labor market 
(Murphy and Zabojnik 2004, 2007). 
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4.2.3 CEO Human Capital and Firm Growth 
In Table 9, columns (1) and (2) provide the results for the regression models to which 
the CEO human capital variables are added. The mean coefficients of the general human 
capital variables (such as reputation, years of experience, career path, number of firms, 
general work experience dummy, educational level, educational fields, and age at which the 
CEO first assumed this position) and the firm-specific human capital variables (such as 
founder and internal hires) are positive and significant. The results in column (3) support the 
assertion that CEO human capital plays an important role in adjusting R&D spending to 
appropriate levels for innovation performance. These results are consistent with H3a and 
H3b. Columns ( 4), (5), and (6) indicate that the general human capital variables, except 
number of firms, are positively and significantly related to firm growth. Conversely, the 
firm-specific human capital variables (such as tenure, founder, gender, and internal hires) are 
non-significant. These results support H4a but not H4b. Table 9 shows that firms' 
innovation performance depends on general CEO human capital, indicating that the average 
general human capital has risen and that it is positively and significantly associated with firm 
growth. 9 
[Insert Table 9 around here.] 
9 In additional verification, I perform unreported analyses with Tobin's Q as a growth opportunity. The results 
remain the same. 
49 
4.2.4 General CEO Human Capital and Selling, General, and Administrative Costs 
Table 10 presents evidence ofthe SG&A cost asymmetry for CEO human capital. The 
estimated value of Log (Saleit/Saleit-l) in column (3) is 0.712 (t = 17.49). This value is 
highly significant, indicating that SG&A costs increase by about 0.71% per 1% increase in 
sales. The coefficients of the general human capital variables in the same column are 
negatively significant, and those of years of experience, career path, and general work 
experience dummy are significant. These results suggests that firms where CEOs have more 
years of experience, various career paths, and general work experience in various industries 
suffer from less SG&A cost asymmetry. The coefficients of educational level and 
educational fields are significant, indicating that firms where CEO have more degrees and 
have studied many disciplines experience less SG&A cost asymmetry. The regression model 
results in column (2) illustrate that firms with a founding or family CEO also have less 
SG&A cost asymmetry. Column (3) suggests that the effects of firm-specific human capital 
disappear when all types of human capital are considered. In summary, Table 10 provides 
evidence that firms with strong general CEO human capital have low SG&A cost asymmetry. 
The differences in firm characteristics are minor even though they are statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 10 around here.] 
The effects of general human capital differ because SG&A costs translate to more 
slack resources in mature firms than in developing firms. Table 11 illustrates that cost 
stickiness is more pronounced in mature firms than in developing firms. This result indicates 
that on the basis of upper echelon theory, we can conclude that CEO human capital 
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influences cost stickiness to a greater extent in mature firms than in developing firms. I find 
significant effects for the subsample of developing firms: that is, years of experience (-0.138, 
t = -2.31), career path (-0.127, t = -2.41), general work experience dummy (-0.202, t =-
1.89), educational field (-0.032, t = -1.94), and age at which the CEO first assumed the 
position ( -0.163, t = -2.12) exhibit a significantly negative coefficient. These results suggest 
that in developing firms, general human capital is adjusted and appropriately influences 
SG&A cost stickiness. In the subsample of mature firms, however, five ofthe 12 variables 
have significant coefficients, specifically, years of experience (-0.054, t = 1.83), career path 
(-0.082, t = -1.99), educational level (-0.095, t = -1.95), tenure (-0.006, t = -2.27), and 
founder (-0.023, t = -1.88). This result indicates that in mature firms, firm-specific human 
capital influences SG&A expenses. CEOs with strong general human capital influence 
SG&A expenses in developing firms, indicating that SG&A cost stickiness is driven by low 
general human capital to a larger extent in mature firms than in developing firms. This 
finding is consistent with H5. 
[Insert Table 11 here.] 
Table 12 lists the results for the three performance measures (i.e., ROA, stock return, 10 
and Tobin's Q), with alternative explanations. The coefficients of all the general human 
capital variables are positive and significant, except for number of firms, BOD experience, 
and general work experience dummy, suggesting that general CEO human capital affects firm 
10 Stock return is measured as [[(SP(t) - SPct-l)) + DPS(t)] I SPct-t)J, where SP(t) is the year-end share closing 
price for year t, SPct-l) denotes the year-end share closing price for year t-1, and DPSct) represents the annual 
dividends paid per share in year t (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Kaplan 1994; Francis eta!. 2008). 
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performance. The results are generally consistent with an efficient market-based explanation 
ofthe firm earnings achieved by CEOs with general managerial skills. In terms ofhuman 
capital theory and upper echelon theory, the overall results support the associations among 
human capital measures, value-enhancing activities, firm growth, and pay premiums. Thus, I 
demonstrate the performance-human capital function of CEOs because R&D expenses and 
SG&A costs with value-enhancing activities influence firm performance and growth. 
[Insert Table 12 around here.] 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
I conduct additional tests to further corroborate the results and provide alternative 
explanations. Typically, these alternative explanations reflect the concern that CEO human 
capital is directly or indirectly affected by firm characteristics. The first issue I address is 
sample selection bias due to endogeneity in CEO hiring. Some firms may prefer certain CEO 
characteristics, which would lead to the endogenous matching of candidates and firms 
(Graham et al. 2010). For example, large firms are more likely to hire CEOs with strong 
human capital because they are viewed as capable of running firms at a high level. I estimate 
a first-stage probit regression of the likelihood that a firm appoints a CEO with strong human 
capital (i.e., one with human capital above the median). This issue is also a concern in 
previous work on CEO characteristics, such as those of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and 
Malmendier and Tate (2005). I find no evidence of a relationship between the qualities of 
hired CEOs and other factors. Thus, this type of selection as a primary hiring factor is 
unsupported by my research. 
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Structural power, or CEO power, 11 is defined as the ability to influence firms' BODs. 
This type of power emerges from multiple sources, such as position and charisma 
(Finkelstein 1992). Tosi et al. (2004) empirically proxy for psychologically perceived CEO 
charisma. Although weak governance can be argued as inherently contributory to CEO 
power, structural CEO power and governance strength are better treated as distinct constructs 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1988). Another structural power measure, CEO=Chair, is a 
variable that measures the concentration of positions in the hands of a CEO. If the CEO is 
not the chairman, he/she has less influence over firm decisions because the chairman is 
sometimes involved in strategic decision making. 12 
The discussion above indicates a need for high, incentive-based compensation that 
coincides with considerable benefits from resolving agency problems through monitoring. 
Nevertheless, benefits from high incentive pay may not be equal across firms. The concern is 
that even if the current environment warrants an increase in CEO compensation, particularly 
of the incentive pay form, CEOs who hold power will be opportunistic. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) argue, for instance, that CEOs have considerable influence over their boards and use it 
to secure excessive compensation. Two theories directly explain the relationship between 
CEO power and compensation in a cross-section of firms. 
To further assess the robustness of the results, I empirically model CEO power as the 
dependent variable explained by the human capital variables as the independent variables. 
Table 7 shows that CEO power and CEO=Chair are positively associated with reputation, 
educational level, family firm dummy, and ROA-measured performance. However, the table 
11 Given the scope of a CEO's power, several researchers (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2004) suggest that CEOs effectively set their own compensation. Bebchuk eta!. (2002) argue that 
executive compensation can be explained by a managerial power approach. This view holds that powerful CEOs 
influence boards of directors into paying them high compensation (Bebchuk et a!. 2002). A substantial body of 
evidence indicates that pay is higher and less sensitive to performance when executives have more power. 
12 The chairman is often the ex-CEO, indicating that the ex-CEO is still involved in decision making. 
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also shows that CEO power is negatively associated with age and size. Overall, the empirical 
evidence suggests that when CEO power increases, the association among reputation, career 
path, educational fields, tenure, founder dummy, and internal hire dummy strengthens, 
whereas that between the age at which the CEO first held the position and size diminishes. 
[Insert Table 7 around here.] 
I repeat the analysis above, but this time incorporates a CEO power variable into the 
regression model. Table 8 presents the estimates of the same regressions as those in Table 5, 
but the former includes CEO power and CEO=Chair as main explanatory variables. Even 
after controlling for CEO power and CEO=Chair, the coefficients of the general human 
capital variables (reputation, years of experience, career path, number of firms, general work 
experience dummy, BOD experience, and educational fields) for salary compensation are 
positive and significant. The coefficients of the firm-specific human capital variables (such 
as tenure and founder) for bonus compensation are also positive and significant. These 
results reinforce the previously discussed findings: CEOs' general human capital is more 
likely related to CEO fixed compensation than to CEO bonus compensation, and CEOs' firm-
specific human capital is more strongly associated with CEO bonus compensation than with 
CEO fixed compensation. Overall, Tables 7 and 8 support the robustness of the results. 
[Insert Table 8 around here.] 
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Previous literature shows that R&D and advertising expenses represent value-
enhancing investments, and therefore positively affect future firm performance (Lev and 
Sougiannis 1996). I replicate the analyses, this time excluding R&D and advertising from 
total SG&A costs, an approach that does not change the results. Similar to other researchers, 
I use the book-to-market ratio as an alternative measure ofumeported firm growth 
opportunities. Lower ratios mean greater growth opportunities because the market's 
valuation of a firm and future cash flow do not capture factors in the book value of company 
assets. This alternative measure of growth opportunities also does not change my results, 
indicating robustness to the use of alternative measures. This measure is also consistent with 
the evidence when I use the variables of value-enhancing investments. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Limitations 
5.1 Conclusion and Implications 
In this dissertation, I focus on the value of CEO human capital in firms, an issue that 
has not been comprehensively investigated in previous research. Previous studies have 
presented mixed results on CEO compensation and firm performance, and have disregarded 
the contributions ofhuman capital. Most previous studies on CEO compensation also focus 
on total CEO compensation contingent on performance, and do not explicitly examine CEO 
human capital. These issues give rise to intriguing concerns, such as whether CEO 
compensation schemes are adequate tools for increasing CEO human capital in a firm, as well 
as how CEO human capital affects firms and what human capital measures are used to 
determine such effects. I carry out factor analysis to formalize and derive testable hypotheses, 
using the multidimensional human capital of CEOs (Dutta 2008). I focus on whether CEO 
human capital is multidimensional (Harris and Helfat 1997; Dutta 2008). For example, 
human capital is categorized into two types: general human capital (applicable across all 
firms) and firm-specific human capital (applicable only to a particular firm). 
Salary compensation (i.e., fixed pay) is positively associated with general CEO human 
capital, and bonus compensation (i.e., contingent incentive pay) is positively associated with 
firm-specific CEO human capital. These findings are empirical evidence that the two types 
of human capital play mutually exclusive roles in determining fixed and incentive 
compensation. Such roles may explain why previous researchers who did not separate 
compensation schemes do not detect a significant role for human capital. Additionally, the 
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current study provides evidence that the career concerns of CEOs are relevant, particularly to 
explaining CEO successions. 
I also investigate whether the two types of CEO human capital differentially drive 
value-enhancing activities (e.g., R&D and SG&A initiatives) for firm growth. On the basis 
of upper echelon theory and human capital theory, this study predicts that human capital and 
strategic decisions on value-enhancing activities have a significant relationship. The results 
are consistent with these predictions. In addition, they support general CEO human capital as 
an important explanation for external CEO successions and suggest the importance of CEO 
human capital in understanding how CEOs with strong human capital have run their firms in 
recent decades. I emphasize that the interpretation of these results does not depend on the 
existence of an agency problem. Even though CEOs are efficient, firm decisions can either 
be poor or effective because CEOs possess different types of human capital. 
This dissertation offers an alternative view of what determines the level of CEO 
compensation schemes and what factors are important to a CEO's operation of a firm. The 
findings have implications for the literature on managerial discretion (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein 1987). Measurable strong CEO human capital lead to high levels of CEO 
compensation, and the results indicate that more able CEOs receive better rewards because 
they contribute to firm performance by formulating and implementing efficient value-
enhancing activities. 
Finally, the findings suggest that the increase in general human capital over the studied 
period is explained by an increase in the relative importance of such capital, in contrast to 
firm-specific human capital, in managing contemporary firms. This study provides direct 
evidence of the growing importance of general managerial human capital versus firm-specific 
human capital. The evidence suggests that boards choose external CEO candidates with 
strong general human capital. This preference possibly stems from the previous lifetime 
experiences ofCEOs being considered indicative of general CEO human capital. 
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This study contributes to research regarding CEO human capital by elucidating the 
compensation schemes and strategic decisions on the investment policies of firms. First, I 
emphasize the importance of considering human capital, which may not have been discussed 
in human capital literature. Second, I reveal the need to ascertain the relationship between 
the value of CEO human capital and different compensation components. This study offers a 
number of interesting implications for understanding human capital in relation to CEOs and 
firms; such understanding should not be restricted to academics, but extended to board 
members and shareholders. Future research can examine how CEO human capital influences 
the strategic interaction between governments and firms with conceptual performance 
measures. 
5.2 Limitations 
The results ofthis study should be interpreted with consideration of its limitations. The 
use of empirical data gives rise to certain inherent weaknesses. Human capital pertains to the 
accumulation of the efforts, skills, and capabilities that people contribute to an organization. 
The scope of the study is limited to collectible data associated with CEO human capital. The 
findings should therefore be interpreted only in this context and should not be generalized to 
other types of CEO human capital. For example, CEO charisma and social skills are related 
to CEO human capital but may involve factors that do not emerge as important in the present 
study. 
The selection of S&P 500 firms from among US firms should also enable 
generalization of the findings to this population. The fact that S&P 500 firms may not 
adequately represent all US firms should be recognized, although no specific bias is found 
and the S&P 500 firms account for 67% of the assets of total domestic firms. Because the 
objective ofthis paper is limited to validating the developed hypotheses, I leave the 
aforementioned issues to future research. 
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Table 1 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics for CEO Compensation, Human Capital, and Firm 
Characteristics 
Sample selection criteria 
Total 
Initial firm-year observations for years 2000-2009 
1. Less missing CEOs' biographical data 
2. Less data for firms with CEO change 
3. Less data form COMPUSTAT 
Final sample 
4,500 
127 
256 
753 
3,364 
The sample consists of3,364 CEOs in S&P 500 firms (2001- 2009 data). The compensation data were obtained 
from the Compustat and proxy statements. All variables are defmed as in appendix. This table reports 
descriptive Statistics. Compensation amounts and sales are expressed in 2001 dollars. All other variables are 
defmed as in appendix. 
Panel A: Descriptive statics for CEO compensation 
Total compensation is the sum of salary, annual bonus, and our valuations for stock options, performance plans, 
phantom stock, and restricted stock. ($ 1 ,000) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev. Lower Median Upper Quartile Quartile 
Total Pay 3364 10,026 15,279 1962 5655 11115 
Salary Pay 3364 871.061 396.849 620.000 875 1069 
Bonus Pay 3364 939 2752 0.000 262 1148 
ln(Total pay) 3364 8.516 1.442 7.80 8.58 9.32 
ln(Bonus) 3364 6.799 1.166 6.215 6.908 7.539 
In( Salary) 3364 6.586 1.201 6.400 6.778 7.000 
Panel B: Human Capital 
Variables N Mean Std Dev. 25t Pet! Median 75t Pet! 
Experience Years 3364 7.796 8.397 4 7 11 
Career Path 3364 4.650 3.158 2 5 10 
Number Firms 3364 2.155 1.762 2 2 6 
General Work Experience dummy 3364 0.347 0.476 0 0 
BOD experience 3364 5.850 0.984 2 6 10 
Education level 3364 1.603 0.527 2 2 
Education Areas 3364 1.734 0.260 1 2 2 
CEO Age 3364 55.503 6.901 51 56 60 
The First CEO age 3364 46.782 5.513 41 46 54 
Reputation 3364 15.112 8.315 11 16 19 
Tenure 3364 6.881 7.082 2 5 9 
CEO from Family-Firm 3364 0.152 0.359 0 0 0 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel C: Reputation as a General Human Capital 
Tone N Mean Std Dev. 251h Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
+ 3364 2.216 9.332 0 0 I 
us 0 3364 4.230 11.528 0 3 
3364 2.216 9.332 0 0 
+ 3364 2.811 9.403 0 0 
International 0 3364 2.642 9.494 0 0 I 
3364 1.599 7.473 0 0 0 
+ 3364 0.407 1.601 0 0 0 
Wire 0 3364 0.297 1.521 0 0 0 
3364 0.211 1.191 0 0 0 
Panel D: CEO Characteristics 
N Mean Std Dev. 25 Pet! Median 751 Pet! 
External Hires(%) 3364 0.281 0.297 0.200 0.250 0.352 
Industry Change 3364 0.173 0.356 0.125 0.165 0.258 (%) 
CEO Power 3364 0.355 0.462 0.231 0 0 
Panel E: Firm Characteristics 
N Mean Std Dev. 251' Pctl Median 751 Pctl 
ROA 3364 0.100 0.083 0.052 0.092 0.144 
Stock Return 3364 0.019 0.436 -0.231 0.015 0.220 
ROE 3364 0.172 0.830 0.103 0.171 0.253 
Tobin's Q 3364 2.055 1.277 1.226 1.646 2.417 
Firm size 3364 22,046 41,584 4,846 9,323 19,092 ($ 1mil) 
Leverage 3364 0.0593 0.217 -0.071 2.406 1.637 
CAPE X 3364 0.0476 0.050 0.017 0.0353 0.061 
R&D/Asset 3364 0.045 0.059 0.004 0.025 0.068 
Growth 3364 0.121 0.213 0.035 0.096 0.175 
Sales ($!mil) 3364 15,769 31,535 2,915 6,824 14,751 
Diversification 3364 0.526 0.438 0 1 1 
SG&A ($ 1 mil) 3364 3,284 1,689 1,824 3,052 3,985 
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Table 2 
CEO Human Capital over the Period 
Panel A: General Human Capital 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Experience Years (years) 7. 121 7.665 8.021 8.069 7.736 7.811 7.727 7.906 8.014 
Career Path 3.723 3.937 4.458 5.017 5.067 5.468 6.241 5.932 5.996 
Number Finns 1.827 1.954 2.042 2.286 2.383 2.364 2.404 2.395 2.305 
BOD Experience 4.523 5.252 5.450 5.600 6.158 5.927 6.180 6.524 6.425 
Education Areas 1.342 1.467 1.571 1.724 1.786 1.789 1.853 1.849 1.942 
Education Level (0-2) 1.324 1.524 1.592 1.627 1.584 1.608 1.657 1.638 1.643 
CEO Age 55.121 55.420 55.675 55.996 55.652 55.698 55.828 56.044 56.076 
The First CEO Age 47.535 46.382 46.517 46.244 46.346 46.033 46.009 46.029 46.021 
Reputation 11.638 12.455 14.285 14.232 16.546 16.346 19.111 19.757 20.052 
Panel B: Firm-specific Human Capital 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Tenure (years) 6.538 6.867 7.085 7.090 6.776 6.795 6.622 6.883 6.925 
Famil~-Firms CEO 15.8% 14.3% 13 .829% 12.698% 11.178% 11 .858% 10.563% 10.057% 10.035% 
Panel C: CEO characteristics 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
External Hires(%) 15.1% 15 .7% 18.149% 22.857% 24.169% 25.067% 25.117% 23.287% 27.052% 
Industry Change(%) 10.9% II. I% 12.455% 14.603% 15.454% 16.172% 16.666% 15.068% 16.854% 
CEO power 0.195 0.215 0.258 0.275 0.318 0.341 0.354 0.389 0.392 
Gender 1.529% 1.752% 1.065% 0.943% 1.212% 1.340% 2.578% 2.725% 2.750% 
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Table 3 
Human Capital by Industry 
Salary Bonus The First Education Education BOD Work Career Number CEOs ' Tenure Family Industry Age Reputation Level Experience Experience firms ' External Industry (I ,000$) ( 1.000$) CEO age (0- 2) Areas (years) (years) Path of Firms Power (years) CEO(%) Hires(%) Change(% 
Energy 959.789 2387 .63 57.375 50.85 8.730 1.515 1. 12 6.32 9.773 2.85 1.54 0.388 8.542 14.027 19.457 7.239 
Materials 827.085 581.969 56.282 49.62 6.156 1.534 1.37 4. 18 4.894 3.28 1.87 0.316 4.631 3.289 13 .157 9.867 
Business 
894.606 941.775 55.810 48.65 15 .133 1.589 1.38 
equipment 5.95 7.255 4.03 2.53 0.318 6.665 11.818 10.942 8.842 
Consumer 
972.890 
equipment 1080.01 55.466 47.52 17. 181 1.473 2.06 5.03 8.894 5.61 3.09 0.329 7.240 18.208 24.567 19.942 
Wholesale and 
retail 963.352 783 .626 55.318 47.61 26.369 1.462 1.67 6.49 7.409 5.84 1.69 0.314 6.750 17.613 10.795 10.227 
Health Care and 
drugs 937.853 623 .233 55 .125 45 .85 9.469 1.766 I 16 4.83 7.376 3.09 1.72 0.320 6.299 6.802 25 .510 21.428 
Financials 774.888 1068.44 56.939 44.93 14.202 1.667 1.86 6.85 8.718 4.65 4.52 0.286 7.7 13 .939 17.272 9.693 
Information 
Technology 712. 162 610.202 53.328 42.57 34 .754 1.552 2.35 3.86 8.022 5.24 4.39 0.311 7.157 13 .812 38 .950 22.3 75 
Telecommunicat 
ion Services 1105.01 832.309 54.769 48.67 40.461 1.846 1.82 5.26 8.384 5.16 4.86 0.288 6.923 0 46.153 30.769 
Utilities 842.751 502.365 58.058 51.96 4.295 1.825 1.45 5.57 6.307 4.37 1.42 0.311 5.360 3.414 29.756 14.146 
This table presents the CEO human capital and CEO compensation for the Globallndustry Classification Standard (GICS). The sample comprises firm-year observations 
from S&P 500 firms during 200 1-2009. It also presents average for the CEO general human capital, firm-specific human capital and average each compensation for each 
of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable defmitions and data sources are 
provided in the Appendix. 
Table 4 
Hypotheses 
This table summarizes the hypotheses and their predicated effect on the explanatory variables. 
Human capital Theory, 
Upper echelon theory 
Firm Decision 
Making 
CEO Decisions 
Making -7 
Value enhancing 
Investments 
Activities 
Compensation 
Schemes 
Outside Hires 
Growth 
R&D expense 
SG&A cost 
asymmetry 
Performance 
Test I 
(table 5,7,8) 
+ 
+ 
Test 2 
(table 6) 
+ 
Test 3 
(table 9) 
+ 
+ 
Test4 
( table I 0, I I) 
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Test 5 
(table 12) 
+ 
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Table 5 
Test of Human Capital Specificity for Fixed and Incentive pay 
Independent 
ln(Salary) ln(Salary) In( Salary) In( Bonus) In( Bonus) ln(Bonus) In( Cash) 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coeffic ient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (!-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (!-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept 3.161 *** 2.627*** 2.992*** 3.112*** 2.828*** 4.321 *** 2.537*** (4.27) (3.16) (5.11) (4.75) (5.99) (4.02) (4.53) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.011** 0.090* 0.014 0.005 0.001 ( 1.99) (I. 78) (1.32) ( 1.21) ( 1.05) 
Experience Years 0.028** 0.065* 0.016 0.007 0.075 (2.01) (I. 72) ( 1.11) (0.35) (1.31) 
Career Path 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.051 0.022 0.034** (2.99) (2.37) (1.38) ( 1.61) (2.02) 
Number Firms 0.079* 0.050** -0.017 -0.009 -0.000 (I. 76) (2.06) ( -1.06) (-1.23) ( -0.27) 
General Work 0.155*** 0.295*** 0.021 0.043 0.116* 
Experience Dummy (2.98) (2.41) (1 .35) (1.55) ( 1.68) 
BOD Experience 0.010** 0.111 * 0.016 0.032 0.067 (I. 98) (I. 70) (0.39) (0.52) (0.68) 
Education Level 0.029** 0.010* -0.002 -0.014 -0.009 ( 1.99) ( 1.85) ( -0.46) ( -0.58) ( -0.59) 
Education Areas 0.039*** 0.031 ** 0.082 0.012* 0.029** (2.53) (2.01) ( 1.63) (1.71) ( 1.99) 
CEO Age 0.009 0.005 -0.085 -0.006 -0.002** ( 1.63) ( 1.60) ( -1.43) (-1.63) ( -1.98) 
The First CEO Age -0.115*** -0.193** -0.019 -0.094* -0.038** (-2.92) (-2.30) ( -1.56) (-1.77) (-2.54) 
Tenure -0.024 -0.019 0.047** 0.039 
0.012** 
(-1.25) (-1.11) ( 1.97) ( 1.57) ( 1.98) 
Founder -0.108 -0.222 0.161 ** 0.130** 0.156 ( -0.59) ( -1.42) (2.17) (2.00) ( 1.58) 
Internal Hires 0.038 0.093 0.024* 0.035* 0.048 ( 1.17) ( 1.46) (1.87) ( 1.77) (1.33) 
Gender -0.001 0.001 * -0.002 -0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.001 ( -1.22) (I. 78) (-1.43) ( -0.59) ( 1.88) (0.29) ( 1.3 I) 
ROA 0.202 0.137 0.191* 0.096* 0.430 0.182* 
0.263* 
(1.56) ( 1.02) ( 1.73) ( 1.66) ( 1.00) ( 1.86) (1.71) 
ROA_ 1 
-0.194** -0.229** -0.329*** 0.387** 0.379** 0.273*** 0.352*** 
(-2.17) (-1.97) ( -2.88) (2.36) (2.22) (2.97) (2.76) 
Stock Return 0.106** 0.141** 0.093* 0.093*** 0.1 09*** 0.115*** 0.106*** (2.27) (2.01) ( 1.68) (2.68) (4.08) (3.24) (3.16) 
Stock Return_1 
0.119** 0.179*** 0.204*** 0.264*** 0.301 *** 0.270*** 0.194*** 
(2.37) (4.01) (3.39) (3.26) (4.04) (3.69) (5.03) 
Leverage 0.190** 0.522*** 0.364** 0.364 -0.514** -0.290** 
-0.306** 
(2.18) (3.94) (2.24) ( 1.24) (-2.33) (-2.18) (-2.15) 
Tobin's Q 0.024* 0.117 0.053** 0.053**** 0.169*** 0.074*** 0.99*** ( 1.78) ( 1.51) (2.33) (4.73) (3.06) (5.78) (4.63) 
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CAPE X 0.678*** 0.845*** 0.841 *** 0.641* 1.561* 1.158*** 0.867*** (2.62) (2.77) (2.80) ( 1.80) (1.91) (3.62) (2.64) 
R&D -0.519* -0.970*** -0.527** -0.727*** -0.811 *** -1.119*** -0.825*** (-1.99) ( -2.83) (-2.19) (-3.19) ( -2.35) ( -2.59) ( -2.23) 
Growth -0.261 -0.305* -0.188 0.247 0.206* 0.304 0.402 (-1.11) (-1.67) (-1.55) ( 1.07) ( 1.86) ( 1.61) ( 1.23) 
Sales 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.073** 0.242*** 0.388*** 0.203** 0.192** (4.53) (2.84) (2.01) (4.55) (5.14) (3.85) (2.31) 
Size 0.115*** 0.153*** 0.145*** 0.205*** 0.344*** 0.445*** 0.423*** (5.68) (4.59) (5.00) (5.13) (4.89) (I 0.68) (5.36) 
Adjusted R2 50.6% 52.4% 53.3% 53.3% 49.8% 51 .8% 54.7% 
N 3364 3364 3364 3364 3364 3364 3364 
Notes: 
The above table is based on a sample of CEOs' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Size is defined as logarithm of total assets. All other variables are defined as in 
appendix. The fum and year fixed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics are based on the Huber-
White robust standard error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers 1993). ***,**,and 
* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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TABLE6 
Panel Estimation of Compensation Components on Firms' Characteristics and New 
Hired CEOs 
ln(Salary) In( Bonus) ln(Total In( Salary) ln(Bonus) ln(Salary) ln(Bonus) 
Independent Pay) 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept 5.305*** 6.274** 5.545*** 4.505*** 4.850*** 5.892*** 4.564*** (9.48) (8.99) (7.84) ( 14.9 1) ( 14.50) (17.82) (10.54) 
External Hires 0.489** 0.302 0.283*** (2.11) ( 1.4 7) (2.56) 
Industry Change -0.193** -0.129 -0.134* -0.245*** -0.156** ( -2.53) (-1.19) (1.88) (-3 .14) ( -1.99) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.001 ** 0.000 0.020* 0.009 0.004 0.014*** 0.008 (2.18) (0.40) (I. 74) ( 1.55) (0.48) (3.26) (1.44) 
Experience Years 0.000* -0.015 0.000** 0.871 ** -0.046 0.002** -0.023 ( 1.89) (-1.04) (2.02) ( 1.99) ( -0.4) (2.22) ( -1.37) 
Career Path 0.074** 0.010* 0.009* -1.339** -0.065 0.088** 0.007 (2.55) ( 1.94) (1.82) ( -2.28) (-0.48) (2.23) (1.33) 
Number Finns 0.00 1 * -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.0 15 0.007* 0.000 (1.93) ( -1.08) (0.64) ( 1.58) ( 1.46) (1.84) (0.54) 
General Work 0.104*** 0.086 0.143** 0.009* -0.056* 0.143*** 0.067* 
Experience Dummy (2.56) ( 1.57) (2.18) ( 1.68) (-1.9 1) (3.06) ( 1.75) 
BOD Experience 0.002* 0.000 0.000* 0.023** 0.333 0.004*** 0.000 ( 1.78) (0.11) ( 1.69) (2.38) (0.9 1) (2.52) (0.64) 
Education Level 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004* -0.055 -0.000 -0.000 (0.22) (-1.16) ( -1.42) ( 1.64) (-0.91) (-0.76) ( -1.28) 
Education Areas 0.041* 0.022 0.014 -0.017* 0.032* 0.054* 0.067 (1.83) ( 1.02) ( 1.39) ( -1.85) ( 1.88) ( 1.94) (0.93) 
CEO Age -0.023 0.000 0.021 0.0 14** 0.0 18 -0.052* 0.009 (-0.77) (0. 19) (0.53) (I. 99) (0.19) (-1.72) ( 1.25) 
The First CEO Age -0.00 1 ** -0.000*** -0.005* 0.47 1.488 -0.007*** -0.006** (-2.10) (-2.84) (-1.94) ( 1.35) (0.97) ( -2.68) (-2 .34) 
Tenure -0.004 0.019** -0.000 -0.002 0.061 ** (-1.04) ( 1.99) ( -0.58) (-0.64) (2.26) 
Founder -0.098** -0.0 12* -0.074 -0.243* 0.0 14* -0.135*** -0.054 (-2.29) (-1.77) ( -1.62) ( -1.88) ( 1.73) (-3 .97) ( -1.44) 
Gender 0.000 0.010 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.00 1 0.008 (0.43) (0.68) (0.55) (-0.74) (0. 14) (0.67) (0.91) 
Size 0.112*** 0.243*** 0.2 14*** 0.223*** 0. 109*** 0.362*** 0.39 1 *** ( 10.98) (9.87) (9.82) (7.71) (9.44) ( 12.52) ( 14.62) 
Adjusted R2 50.2% 51.3% 49.4% 42.3% 39.5% 38.2% 39.4% 
N 121 121 121 86 86 45 45 
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The above table is based on a sample of CEOs ' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Size is defmed as logarithm of total assets. Columns 4 and 5 consider internally 
promoted CEO inside the firm. Columns 6 and 7 consider CEOs from outside the firm. All other variables are 
defmed as in appendix. The firm and year fixed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics are based on 
the Huber-White robust standard error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers 1993). 
*** , ** , and* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Test of Human Capital Variables for CEO Power 
Independent CEO power CEO=Chair 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept 0.499*** 0.232*** (5.14) (4.68) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.031 ** 0.028** (1.97) (2.43) 
Experience Years 0.017 0.029** (1.62) (1.99) 
Career Path 0.023*** 0.133*** (2.24) (2.82) 
Number Firms 0.011 *** -0.052 (2.68) (-0.67) 
General Work Experience 0.042 0.002 
Dummy (0.98) (1.33) 
BOD Experience -0.000 0.057** ( -0.19) (2.13) 
Education Level 0.063 -0.037 (1.63) (-0.61) 
Education Areas 0.067** 0.54* (1.97) (1.72) 
CEO Age 0.054 0.106 ( 1.15) ( 1.45) 
The First CEO Age -0.086 -0.092* ( -1.62) (-1.92) 
Tenure 0.081 0.068** (1.03) (1.99) 
Founder 0.129* 0.152*** ( 1. 76) (4.67) 
Internal Hire 0.174 0.126** (1.52) (2.06) 
Gender -0.028 -0.004 (-1.52) ( -1.55) 
Adjusted R2 61.2% 59.3% 
N 3364 3364 
Notes: 
The above table is based on a sample of CEOs ' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Size is defmed as logarithm of total assets. All other variables are defmed as in 
appendix. The finn characteristics, the firm and year fixed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics 
are based on the Huber-White robust standard error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
(Rogers 1993). ***, **, and* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Test of Human Capital Variables for Fixed Pay and Incentive Pay 
Independent 
In( Salary) ln(Bonus) 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept 4.044*** 3.289*** (8.36) (6.84) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.042* 0.033 ( 1.87) ( 1.0 I) 
Experience Years 0.047* 0.151 ( 1.83) ( 1.59) 
Career Path 0.037** 0.163 ( 1.98) (0.53) 
Number Firms 0.041* -0.009 ( 1.89) ( -1.37) 
General Work 0.142** 0.133 
Experience Dummy (2.16) ( 1.60) 
BOD Experience 0.084* -0.002 ( 1.86) ( -0.72) 
Education Level -0.014 -0.003 ( -1.4 7) (-0.91 ) 
Education Areas 0.072** 0.060* (2.04) ( 1.86) 
CEO Age 0.016 -0.009* (1 .52) (-1.74) 
The First CEO Age -0.124** -0.093* ( -2.4 7) (-1.91) 
Tenure -0.094 0.046* (-1.53) ( 1.66) 
Founder -0.183 0.141*** ( -1.52) (2.87) 
Internal Hire 0.129 0.095* ( 1.54) ( 1.84) 
Gender -0.006 0.009 ( -1.06) (0.85) 
CEO power 0.498*** 1.878*** (6. 19) (7.96) 
CEO=Chair 0.123*** 0.183* (2.85) (1.83) 
Adjusted R2 57.7% 51.8% 
N 3364 3364 
Notes: 
The above table is based on a sample of CEOs' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Size is defmed as logarithm of total assets . All other variables are defmed as in 
appendix. The firm characteristics, the firm and year ftxed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics 
are based on the Huber-White robust standard error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
(Rogers 1993). ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Test of CEO Human Capital for R&D Activities and Firm Growth 
ln(R&D/Sal ln(R&D/Sal ln(R&D/Sa log(Salesit log(Salesi, log(Salesit 
Independent es) es) les) / Salesit-1 / Salesit-1 / SaleSit-1 ) 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept 3.128*** 1.084** 2.312*** 2.879*** 1.767*** 2.289*** (7.27) (2.36) (6.15) (I 0.295) (4.333) (11.24) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.008* 0.004* 0.011** 0.015* ( 1.87) ( 1.66) (2.00) ( 1.82) 
Experience Years 0.010** 0.006* 0.028* 0.033* (2.00) (I. 72) (I. 72) ( 1.91) 
Career Path 0.202** 0.147*** 0.254*** 0.151*** (2.46) (2.87) (2.63) (2.59) 
Number Firms 0.178** 0.097** -0.038 -0.163 (2.14) ( 1.98) ( -0.69) ( -0.53) 
General Work 0.007* 0.011* 0.109*** 0.107** Experience ( 1.77) ( 1.69) (3.02) (2.37) 
Dummy 
BOD Experience -0.002 -0.022 0.025** 0.033* ( -0.57) (-1.16) (2.06) (I. 72) 
Education Level 0.211 *** 0.114** 0.019* 0.020* (2.63) (2.24) ( 1.92) (I. 72) 
Education Areas 0.176** 0.114* 0.112** 0.1 03*** (2.26) (1.87) (2.26) (2.71) 
CEO Age -0.098 -0.432 -0.58 -0.060 ( -1.45) (-1.64) ( -1.33) ( -1.56) 
The First CEO 
-0.007* -0.008** -0.071 ** -0.078*** 
Age ( -1.82) (-2.19) (-1.98) (-2.96) 
Tenure -0.059 -0.129 -0.073 
-0.095 
(-1.52) (-1.54) ( -1.39) (-1.64) 
Founder 0.263*** 0.151*** 0.072 -0.133 (3.11) (2.67) (!.II) (-0.81) 
Internal Hire 0.018** 0.023** 
0.222* 0.183 
(2.28) (2.08) (1.66) (0.83) 
Gender -0.050 -0.124 -0.177 0.004 -0.084 0.015 (-1.33) ( -1.4 7) (-1.59) ( 1.55) (-0.93) (1.20) 
ROA 0.182 0.280 0.196 
0.527*** 0.599*** 0.648*** 
(0.46) (0.06) ( 1.16) (4.42) (5.31) (4.83) 
0.332*** 0.417*** 1.786*** 0.121 *** 0.131 *** 0.174*** ROA_1 (2.64) (3.29) (3.16) (2.94) (3.42) (2.57) 
0.105 0.007 0.093* 0.281 *** 0.297** 0.243** Stock Return ( 1.54) ( 1.34) ( 1.68) (4.85) (3.52) (2.27) 
Stock Return_1 
0.190** 0.153* 0.264** 0.161* 0.321 0.204 
(2.31) ( 1.79) (2.24) (I. 74) ( 1.54) ( 1.55) 
-0.074*** -0.067*** -0.153*** 0.093** 0.058** 0.075* Leverage (-2.78) ( -4.42) ( -2.93) ( 1.98) (2.05) (I. 73) 
Tobin's Q 0.101 0.368* 0.241* 0.511 ** 0.792** 0.608** ( 1.62) (I. 73) ( 1.80) (2.11) (2.20) ( 1.99) 
CAP EX 0.119** 0.112*** ( 1.99) (2.56) 
Growth 0.212*** 0.157** (2.88) (2.99) 
Size 0.345*** 0.491 *** (8.14) (9.14) 
Adjusted R2 58.6% 51.7% 
N 985 985 
Notes: 
0.127** 
(2.19) 
0.201 ** 
(2.35) 
0.311*** 
(8.13) 
50.3% 
985 
0.712* 
( 1.86) 
0.221 
(1.36) 
61.3% 
3364 
0.574** 
(2.04) 
0.082 
(0.83) 
52.4% 
3364 
71 
0.894 
( 1.54) 
0.334 
( 1.41) 
50.3% 
3364 
The above table is based on a sample of CEOs' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Size is defined as logarithm of total assets. To be samples, we consider firms 
reporting R&D expense among S&P 500 firms. All other variables are defined as in appendix. The firm and 
year fixed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics are based on the Huber-White robust standard 
error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers 1993). ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Test of CEO Human Capital for SG&A Expenses 
Log( SG&A it I Salesit Log( SG&A it I Salesit Log( SG&A it I Salesit 
Independent I SG&A it-1 I I SG&A it-1 I I SG&A it-1 I Sales· _ ) Sales·_ ) Sales· _ ) 
Variables 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept -0.461 *** -0.444*** -0.362*** (-7.27) (-5.36) ( -5 . 75) 
Log(Salesit I 0.561 *** 0.612*** 0.712*** 
Salesit-1 ) ( 15 .26) (21.53) ( 17.49) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.153 0.183 (1.27) (0.76) 
Experience Years -0.098* -0.1 02* (-1.91) (-1.74) 
Career Path -0.057** -0.079** (-2.41) ( -2.29) 
Number Firms 0.082 0.102 (1.52) ( l. 1 8) 
General Work 
-0.332* -0.292* Experience ( -1.69) ( -1.93) 
Dummy 
BOD Experience 0.098 0.123 ( l. 19) ( 1.43) 
Education Level -0.149 -0.084* (- 1.54) (-1.71) 
Education Areas -0.232* -0. 193** (-1.84) (-2.04) 
CEO Age 0.097 0.057 (0.82) ( 1.26) 
The First CEO 
-0.163** -0.171** 
Age (-2.12) (-1.97) 
Tenure -0.046 -0.004 (-1.27) ( -0.94) 
Founder -0.023* -0.019 ( -1.88) ( -1.59) 
Internal Hire 0.009 0.014 (1.22) ( 1.39) 
Gender 0.049 0.072 0.58 (0.31) ( 1.06) (0.92) 
ROA 0.082*** 0.080** 0.096** (2.56) (2.06) (2.36) 
ROA_1 
0.232*** 0.271 *** 0.186** 
(3.10) (3.74) (2.16) 
Stock Return -0.005 -0.007 -0.093 (-0.24) (-1.34) (-1.18) 
Stock Return_1 
-0.012*** -0.024*** -0.007** 
( -2.58) (-3.01) ( -2.43) 
Leverage 0.190** 0.153* 0.364 (2. 18) ( l. 79) ( 1.24) 
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Tobin's Q -0.074*** -0.067*** -0.073*** (-5.78) ( -4.42) ( -4.33) 
CAPE X 0.158* 0.268* 0.241* ( 1.92) ( 1.73) ( 1.80) 
R&D 0.11 9 0.112* 0.127** ( 1.59) ( 1.86) (2.1 9) 
Loss -0.022 -0.016 -0.07 (-0.96) (-0.70) (-1.07) 
Size 0.425*** 0.558*** 0.345*** (8.68) (5.14) (8.83) 
Adjusted R2 64.6% 54.7% 60.3% 
N 3364 3364 3364 
Notes: 
The above table is based on a sample of CEOs' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Size is defmed as logarithm of total assets. All other variables are defmed as in 
appendix. All human capital variables are interaction terms with Log (Sales_it I Sales_(it-1)). The standard 
human capital variables, the finn and year fixed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics are based on 
the Huber-White robust standard error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers 1993). 
***,**,and* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Table 11: CEO Human Capital SG&A Cost for Developing versus Mature Firms 
Notes: 
Independent 
Variables 
Intercept 
Ln(Reputation) 
Experience Years 
Career Path 
Number Firms 
General Work 
Experience Dummy 
BOD Experience 
Education Level 
Education Areas 
CEO Age 
The First CEO Age 
Tenure 
Founder 
Internal Hire 
Gender 
Adjusted R2 
N 
Developing firms 
(Std. Dev of 
sales>=median) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
-0.147*** 
(-3.12) 
0.003 
( 1.47) 
-0.138** 
(-2.31) 
-0.127** 
(-2.41) 
0.082 
( 1.52) 
-0.202* 
(-1.89) 
0.008 
( 1.44) 
-0.009 
( -1.54) 
-0.032* 
(-1.94) 
0.097 
(I. 12) 
-0.163** 
(-2.12) 
-0.005 
( -1.58) 
-0.009 
( -1.29) 
0.025 
( 1.54) 
0.049 
(0.31) 
58.3% 
1682 
Mature firms 
(Std. Dev of 
sales<=median) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
-0.044** 
( -2.36) 
0.000* 
( 1.75) 
-0.054* 
( -1.83) 
-0.082** 
(-1.99) 
0.000 
( 1.35) 
-0.104 
(-1.54) 
0.105 
( 1.22) 
-0.095* 
(-1.95) 
-0.152 
(-1.63) 
0.034* 
(I. 72) 
-0.092 
(-1.32) 
-0.006** 
( -2.27) 
-0.023* 
( -1.88) 
0.019 
(1.22) 
0.072 
( 1.06) 
54.7% 
1682 
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The above table is based on a sample of CEOs' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The sample is portioned into mature ftrms and growth ftrms based on the life-cycle 
stage of each ftrm year, calculated as the standard deviation of sales over the five years prior to the event year 
divided by the mean of sales over five years prior to the event year (Banker et a!. 20ll).Size is deftned as 
logarithm of total assets. All other variables are defined as in appendix. All human capital variables are 
interaction terms with Log (Sales_it I Sales_(it-1)). The standard human capital variables, the economics 
variables, the firm and year fixed effects are not reported in the table. The t-statistics are based on the Huber-
75 
White robust standard error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993). ***,**,and 
*denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 12: CEO Human Capital and Firm Performance 
Independent 
ROA Stock Return Tobin's Q 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Intercept 0.941 *** 0.164*** 0.462*** (5.06) (10.06) (3.22) 
Ln(Reputation) 0.153 0.182** 0.183 ( 1.27) ( 1.97) (0.76) 
Experience Years 0.008* 0.091 * 0.052* (1.91) ( 1.88) (1.74) 
Career Path 0.057** 0.008* 0.079** (2.41) (1.82) (2.29) 
Number Firms -0.012 0.003 -0.102 (-1.32) ( 1.35) ( -1.18) 
General Work 
-0.1 02* 0.005 -0.092* Experience ( -1.69) (I. 12) (-1.71) 
Dummy 
BOD Experience 0.098 0.068 0.123 ( 1.19) ( 1.24) (1.43) 
Education Level 0.149 -0.009 -0.084 ( 1.54) (-1.24) (-1.61) 
Education Areas 0.032* 0.002* 0.093** ( 1.92) ( 1.84) (2.04) 
CEO Age 0.017 -0.003 0.097 (0.62) ( -1.60) ( 1.42) 
The First CEO 
-0.073** -0.092** -0.021 * 
Age (-2.06) ( -2.32) (-1.67) 
Tenure -0.159 -0.086 -0.104* (-1.24) (-1.57) (-1.94) 
Founder 0.724** 0.023*** 0.319*** (2.1 7) . (3.88) (3.59) 
Internal Hire -0.003 0.009* 0.014 (-0.09) (1.82) (1.13) 
Gender 0.049 0.042 0.038 (1.31) (1.26) (0.62) 
Adjusted R2 44.6% 44.7% 42.3% 
N 3364 3364 3364 
Notes: 
The above table is based on a sample of CEOs' human capital can be tracked through our hand-collecting data, 
COMPUST AT and CRSP. Size is defined as logarithm of total assets. All other variables are defmed as in 
appendix. The economics variables, the firm and year fixed effects are not reported in the table. All regressions 
include two-digit SIC code industry dummies. The t-statistics are based on the Huber-White robust standard 
error, robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993). ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Model of Human Capital, Human Capital Effectiveness, Compensation Schemes, and Firm 
Performances based on Upper Echelon Theory 
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Figure 2 
Cross-sectional distribution of changes in externally appointed CEOs from 2001 to 2009. The sample consists 
of S&P 500 firms for which CEO profile data are available. Variable definitions and data sources are provided 
in the Appendix. 
28.00% 
26.00% 
24.00% 
22.00% 
20.00% 
18.00% 
16.00% 
14.00% 
12.00% 
10.00% ----.--,-
l.t") \.0 ........ 
8 8 8 
N N N 
-r--1 
00 0'\ 
8 8 
N N 
-+- External Hires(%) 
~Industry Change(%) 
79 
Figure 3 
Average years of work experience, BOD experience, and tenure from 2001 to 2009. All variables are 
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4 
Other types of CEO human capital per year from 2001 to 2009. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 951h 
ercentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are rovided in the A endix. 
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Appendix: Methodology for Variables 
Human Capital Measure: Using CEOs in S&P 500 firms, I proxy for their human capital as below. Some 
CEOs with degrees belonging to more than one group are classified in multiple categories. 
Panel A: General Human Capital Variables 
Variable Description 
Experience Years 
Career Path 
Number Firms 
General Work 
Experience dummy 
BOD Experience 
Education Areas 
Education level 
CEO_age 
The First CEO age 
Previous 
financial career 
Previous Accounting c 
areer 
Previous technological 
career 
Previous management 
career 
Previous law career 
Previous financial edu 
cation 
Previous Business Ad 
ministration education 
Previous technological 
education 
Number of years which CEO has worked as a CEO. 
Number of career path CEO has had on past work experience in publicly traded firms. 
Number of firms where CEO has worked based on past work experience in publicly tr 
aded fmns. 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the number of industries (two-digit SIC) 
where a CEO worked based on his work experience in publicly-listed firms prior to 
the current position is greater than one ,otherwise 0 
Number of years which CEO has worked on the board of directors on past work 
experience. 
The number of areas which CEOs have studies during their career. 
The education level of CEO has earned the education degree before becoming the CE 
0 . When CEO's education got above master or MBA degree, then the dummy variable 
i 2; or when CEO's education got the Bachelor degree, then I; otherwise 0 
Age of the CEO.l also separate groups in the indicated age range ( -52,53-55,56-59,60 
-62,63-92) 
CEO age when CEO starts to work as a CEO position. 
ifCEOs' main previous career is ftnancial institution and financial consulting firms t 
hen I, otherwise 0 
If CEOs previously worked as a CFO, treasurer, accountant, or other related professio 
nal in a ftrm then I, otherwise 0 
ifCEOs are individual patent holders, or if they previously worked as an engineer oro 
ther technically oriented professional then I, otherwise 0 
if CEO ' main previous career is related with various management team then l, other 
wieO 
if CEOs' main previous career is related with law area then I, otherwise 0 
ifCEOs' main previous education is financial area(undergraduate or graduate degrees 
in accounting, fmance, and economics) then I, otherwise 0 
ifCEOs' main previous education is business administration area(undergraduate degre 
e in business. marketing, management or MBA) then I, otherwise 0 
ifCEOs' main previous education is technological area( degrees in engineering or the 
natural sciences) then I, otherwise 0 
Previous law educatio 
n 
US Reputation 
International 
Reputation 
Wireless Reputation 
Reputation 
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ifCEOs' main previous education is law area( degree in law) then 1, otherwise 0 
the number of articles in the major US in which the CEO's named in the S&P 500 
the number of articles in the major global business in which the CEO's named in the S 
&P 500 
the number of articles in the major wire services in which the CEO's named in the S 
&P 500 
the number of articles in the whole media ( 3 *the number of articles with positive 
tone + the number of articles with neutral tone- the number of articles with negative 
tone) 
Panel B: Firm-specific Human Capital Variables 
Variable 
Tenure 
Internal Hires 
Founder 
Description 
CEO's firm experience Prospectuses Tenure or number of years the CEO has been 
working for the current company. 
Dummy variable which if industries where CEO has worked previously bases on p 
ast CEO job experience are the same as the current company, then 0, otherwise 1) 
Iffami1y-fmns are defmed as those in which one or more family members are 
CEO or directors, or own 5% or more of the firm's equity, either individually or as 
a group then 1, otherwise 0 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics 
Variable 
CEO=Chair 
CEO Power 
Gender 
Industry Change 
Description 
Dummy variable which if CEO is also chair of the board, then 1 and zero otherwis 
e. 
CEO total compensation/ Five execute members ' total compensation. 
Dummy variable that If the gender ofCEOs are male, then 0 female 1 
CEO's industry change in the current fmn from the previous firm based on SIC 2 
code.( Dummy variable which if industries where CEO has worked previously 
bases on past CEO job experience are the same as the current company, then 0, 
otherwise l) 
Panel D: Firm Characteristics 
Variable 
Stock Return 
ROA 
Firm size 
ln(size)it 
Description 
(the market-based measured offmn performance)Return on Stock: Shareholder Tot 
a! Return = Capital Gains + Dividends 
(the accounting-based measure offmn performance)To reward CEO effort, fmns bas 
e the long term compensation on fmn performance for the year. The earnings can aff 
ect the ability of a fmn to pay cash compensation. So we us 
ROA to measure firm performance. =EBIITDA/Jagged assets 
We measure fmns' size using market capitalization firms' sales revenue data. 
Leverage 
Tobin's Q 
R&D 
CAP EX 
Loss 
Growth 
SG&A 
Sales 
Diversification 
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Industry adjusted total debt divided by total assets (Compustat TD/AT) 
Sum of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided b 
y total assets (Compustat (AT +CSHOxPRCC _F-CEQ)/AT)). 
R&D expenses (Compustat XRD). 
Capital expenditures divided by total assets (CAPX/AT). 
One if the company reports a net loss(Compustat #172); zero otheiWise 
The percentage change of sales over two years. 
Selling, general, and administrative costs (Compustat # 189) 
Log of Sales Revenues in thousands ofUS$ (Compustat REVT). 
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a flrm has more than one business segm 
ent, and zero otheiWise (Compustat). 
Panel E: CEO Compensation 
Variable 
Total compensation 
Cash compensation 
Equity compensation 
Salary compensation 
Bonus compensation 
Log changes in 
Salary 
Log changes in 
Bonus 
Log changes in 
Cash Compensation 
Log changes in 
Total Compensation 
Description 
Measured by total compensation pay of CEO for firms (stock option + salary + bonus). 
Bonuses were relatively fued component pay (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Total comp 
ensation composed of cash plus long-term compensation. Stock option was valued usin 
g the Black-Scholes method. To adjust for inflation, compensation data were deflated t 
o 2008 dollars using the CPI index ( US department of labor) 
Salary plus bonus in thousand $ (Execucomp TOTAL_ CURR). 
Value of restricted stock granted plus value of options granted in thousand$ (Execuco 
mp RSTKGRNT + OPTION_ AWARDS_ BLK _VALUE). 
Salary in thousand $ (Execucomp salary). 
Bonus in thousand$ (Execucomp bonus). 
ln(salary)t - ln(salary)t-1 . 
ln(bonus)t - ln(bonus)t-1. 
ln(TOTAL_CURR)t - ln(TOTAL_CURR)t-1 . 
ln(TDC2)t - ln(TDC2)t-l . 
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